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ABSTRACT 
  
In August, 2017, a white nationalist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia took place, 
attracting media attention and responses from politicians. President Donald Trump in particular 
issued three responses, but was undemocratic in the sense that he refused to explicitly repudiate 
the racist, extremist groups at the rally. This study asks how the 52 Republican senators in office 
during the rally responded to the rally and Donald Trump’s responses in order to determine how 
strongly these Republicans are upholding democratic norms and ideals. I first tested to see if a 
variety of characteristics had any effect on a senator’s response: state (geographic location), 
reelection year, whether they are seeking reelection, who won their state in the 2016 Republican 
primary, and who won their state in the 2016 general election. However, it appeared none of 
these characteristics strongly indicated any particular response strategy. 
I turned to an inductive, qualitative analysis in order to decipher these senators’ 
responses. In total, I analyzed 333 responses, which included tweets, retweets, Facebook posts, 
and press releases. I discovered three broad themes that categorize Republican senators’ 
responses: 1) “We as the American people…,” in which 16 senators attempted to address race 
through unified, American language, 2) “Criticism without explicitly criticizing,” in which 30 
senators attempted to break with the President’s rhetoric without challenging him explicitly, and 
3) “Mr. President…,” in which 13 senators explicitly denounced Trump’s responses. Broadly, 
Republican senators, while they did address race, failed to do so in relation to their own party. 
Crucially, they also generally failed to call out Trump’s problematic behavior at a time when he 
was explicitly challenging democratic norms. I ultimately argue the Republican Party needs to 
reverse this behavior in order to foster a truly multicultural, multiethnic democracy with robust 
norms and ideals that work for all Americans. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
 On August 12, 2017, a movement once mostly confined to Internet websites, blogs, and 
message boards—the “alt-right”—came into focus for Americans in a deliberately and 
shockingly public way. Videos and images of the “Unite The Right” rally in Charlottesville, 
Virginia dominated nearly every major media outlet, with videos and still images of torch-
wielding protesters blazing across front pages and primetime shows. Supposedly a rally to 
protest the removal of a Robert E. Lee statue, those participating used it as an opportunity to 
promote their white nationalist beliefs. When the rally became deadly after a car struck 32-year-
old counter-protester Heather Heyer, the Charlottesville rally became the center of media 
attention. After such a public display of racism and violence in Charlottesville, some Republican 
influencers believed there was a need to speak out. For example, on August 12, Paul Ryan 
tweeted: “The views fueling the spectacle in Charlottesville are repugnant. Let it only serve to 
unite Americans against this kind of vile bigotry” (Ryan, 2017). 
On the same day of the rally, President Trump addressed reporters regarding the event, 
where he said, “We condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of hatred, 
bigotry, and violence on many sides. On many sides” (The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2017, para. 5). As Republican influencers were drafting statements in response to the 
Charlottesville rally, some deemed it necessary to also respond to the President’s statement, 
particularly with regard to his initial refusal to explicitly denounce the white nationalist, neo-
Nazi, alt-right actors. Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican serving the state of Colorado and 
chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, tweeted in response to the 
President’s comments on Saturday: “Mr. President - we must call evil by its name. These were 
white supremacists and this was domestic terrorism” (Gardner, 2017). President Trump was 
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presumably prompted to hold another press conference on Monday, August 14, where he made a 
more concrete statement: “Racism is evil. And those who cause violence in its name are 
criminals and thugs, including the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups 
that are repugnant to everything we hold dear as Americans” (The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2017, para. 7). 
     The responses regarding the Charlottesville rally continued. On Tuesday, August 15, 
President Trump reinforced his first statement, saying there “were very fine people, on both 
sides” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017). 
Q:    (Inaudible) both sides, sir.  You said there was hatred, there was violence on both 
sides.  Are the -- 
  
THE PRESIDENT:  Yes, I think there’s blame on both sides.  If you look at both sides -- 
I think there’s blame on both sides.  And I have no doubt about it, and you don’t have any 
doubt about it either.  
  
And if you reported it accurately, you would say. 
  
Q:    The neo-Nazis started this.  They showed up in Charlottesville to protest -- 
  
THE PRESIDENT:  Excuse me, excuse me.  They didn’t put themselves -- and you had 
some very bad people in that group, but you also had people that were very fine people, 
on both sides.  You had people in that group. (The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2017). 
  
The President’s choice of rhetoric in this third statement, using the term “very fine people,” 
elicited more responses from Republicans. While Republicans were attempting to respond to the 
rally, it was evident they were responding to Donald Trump simultaneously. For example, Paul 
Ryan, despite already having addressed the rally on August 12, tweeted again on August 15: 
“We must be clear. White supremacy is repulsive. This bigotry is counter to all this country 
stands for. There can be no moral ambiguity” (Ryan, 2017). Because of the timing of Ryan’s 
tweet, it is reasonable to assume he is responding more to President Trump’s response on 
August 15 than he was to the rally itself, which he already addressed three days prior. 
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In this study, I will address the question of how Republican senators—a group of elite, 
influential Republicans—in office during the rally responded to the events in Charlottesville as 
well as Donald Trump’s responses to the rally. 
 Addressing the responses to Trump, not just the responses to the rally, is important 
because it positions political parties—the Republican Party specifically—as democracy’s 
“gatekeepers,” as outlined by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Specifically, Donald Trump broadly 
exhibits what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) describe as behavior that threatens democratic norms 
and values. Because of this, it is the responsibility of the Republican Party (of which Donald 
Trump is the current leader) to act as democracy’s gatekeeper and explicitly call him out when 
he exudes this problematic behavior and rhetoric. The time is also particularly opportune as 
Republicans control a majority of Congress and state houses (Partisan composition of state 
houses, 2017). 
 The Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump’s responses to it reveal Trump’s troubling 
toleration of violence and violation of democratic norms. Most importantly, Levitsky and Ziblatt 
(2018) argue that these democratic norms are the foundation of America’s democracy and have 
sustained it through modern political history. Through 1) mutual toleration and 2) institutional 
forbearance, political parties have coexisted in a stable democracy throughout the past several 
decades (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). It is important for political parties to play their role as 
democracy’s gatekeepers in order to preserve these norms. For example, there was a bipartisan 
effort to uncover the truth amidst Nixon’s Watergate scandal, with each party treating the other 
as a valid actor and generally refraining from vilifying the other side.  
 Through an analysis of Republican senators’ responses to both the Charlottesville rally 
and Donald Trump’s responses, this study argues it is ultimately clear that they did not, as one 
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general coalition, act as democracy’s gatekeepers. Only 13 out of 52 total senators explicitly 
criticized the President by name, which should have been the baseline act of a “gatekeeper.” 
 Why would this be the case for Republican senators? It seems logical that the 
preservation of democracy is important. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue it is often difficult to 
recognize potential authoritarian or democracy-violating individuals because of their rise or 
emergence through democratic means—not a dictatorial, violent, or militaristic takeover. 
Furthermore, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) explain that political parties may indeed encourage or 
help potential authoritarian leaders within their own party (once elected) because they believe 
they 1) can control the figure into complying with party leaders and democratic norms, and 2) 
believe they can obtain political success (legislation and policy initiatives) by finding areas of 
overlap, or common ground, with the figure. It also seems there is a pressure to help these 
leaders in order to achieve electoral success as well. In other words, a politician may refrain from 
criticizing a problematic figure if they think it could jeopardize their reelection. This seems to be 
the strategy thus far for the Republican Party during Donald Trump’s presidency.  
 In addition, the Charlottesville rally can also be understood and contextualized through 
the Republican Party’s complicated history with race. Several scholars (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, 
Hemmer, 2016, and McGirr, 2015, for example) have outlined the rise of the modern Republican 
Party as it relates to race and exacerbating racial divides as a means to obtain votes during the 
mid to late 20th century. The Republican Party failed to broadly denounce Trump’s rhetoric, 
resulting in what one could argue as a “pass” to white supremacy groups such as the alt-right. 
This reveals where the party falls in a complicated historical narrative of its handling of race in 
America, especially given electoral concerns that presumably further deterred sitting Republican 
senators from explicitly denouncing Trump’s rhetoric. 
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 That being said, it would be unfair to not mention that there is a coalition of Republican 
senators—13 senators, or 25%—that did explicitly repudiate both the events at the 
Charlottesville rally and, crucially, Donald Trump’s responses to it. It is worth exploring what 
these senators have in common, and what makes them important members of the Party as swing 
votes. I argue that these senators can first begin to demonstrate new, normative behavior for 
Republicans regarding the conversation about race in America, especially in relation to their 
party. Even more, they prove they are willing to check Trump’s antidemocratic behavior both 
with their rhetoric and with their voting patterns more than other Republican senators, acting as 
the gatekeepers of democracy Levitsky and Ziblatt (2016) deem imperative. However, because 
only 25% of Republican senators denounced explicitly, it was still an overall failure of 
Republican senators to act as democracy’s gatekeepers. 
 Moving forward in this study, Chapter 2 will situate the Republican Party against the 
backdrop of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) theory in How Democracies Die: that political parties’ 
role is to act as gatekeepers to prevent authoritarian and demagogic leaders from successfully 
acquiring public office and, once there, from eroding democratic norms and processes. I will also 
place the Republican Party in a much broader historical narrative—which many scholars detail—
about the Republican Party’s grappling with race in America. Chapter 3 will explain methods of 
acquiring and analyzing data, the Republican senators’ response to the data, as well as the 
limitations of this data. I used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to analyze 
the phenomenon and driving forces behind Republican senators’ responses, especially focusing 
on qualitative methods after the quantitative results were inconclusive. Chapter 4 will provide a 
detailed account of findings—both quantitative patterns in data as well as qualitative rhetorical 
themes. Although Republican senators broadly failed to act as gatekeepers of democracy, there 
 10 
was a group of senators who more boldly challenged the President. It was also evident 
Republicans sought ways to discuss race without directly addressing Trump. Finally, Chapter 5 
will discuss why these findings matter, potential ways forward for the Republican Party in light 
of their response to the Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump, and areas of future research. 
Chapter 6 will be my conclusion, where I offer parting thoughts on democracy in America and 
the Republican Party as it stands in 2018. 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 In this literature review, I contextualize the Charlottesville rally and the Republican Party 
within a framework that constructs the environemnt in which both exist(ed). First, I detail 
Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) theory that it is the responsibility of political parties to act as 
democracy’s gatekeepers, particularly in reference to Donald Trump and the Republican Party as 
it exists currently. Second, I dive into a missing element from Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) 
theoretical framework that is crucial to this study: the Republican Party and its relationship with 
race in America. Because the Charlottesville rally’s themes were based on white supremacy and 
white nationalism, it is important to understand the Republican Party as it relates to the topic of 
race. For this reason, I will explain the current Republican Party and how it has interacted with 
race in order to contextualize the senators’ responses to the Charlottesville rally and Donald 
Trump’s responses. In the context of this study, both of these frameworks will provide a way to 
understand Republican senators’ responses to the violence present during and following the 
Charlottesville rally. 
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Political parties as democracy’s “gatekeepers” 
 In a sweeping analysis of democracy and its failures over the course of global history, 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) contextualize Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency and first year in 
office as a threat to democracy not completely unlike undemocratic leaders outside the United 
States. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) assert that, based on Linz and Stepan’s (1978) work on the 
breakdown of democratic regimes, there are four “behavioral warning signs” to identify 
authoritarianism: 
1. Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game 
2. Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents 
3. Toleration or encouragement of violence 
4. Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media (p. 21-22) 
 
Oftentimes, candidates that meet these criteria are what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) call 
“populist outsiders,” or “figures who, claiming to represent the voice of ‘the people,’ wage war 
on what they depict as a corrupt and conspiratorial elite” (p. 22). Furthermore, Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) warn that these populist outsiders often attack democratic institutions once in 
office. The responsibility to stop these individuals from gaining power, Levitsky and Ziblatt 
(2018) argue, falls to political parties and party leaders. In other words, political parties and its 
leaders are democracy’s gatekeepers (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). According to the test above, 
Donald Trump meets each indicator of authoritarian behavior, challenging the Republican Party 
to act as a gatekeeper of American democracy.  
 The responsibility to stop a populist outsider or authoritarian individual from obtaining 
power happens through what Nancy Bermeo calls “distancing” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline five different ways political parties may distance themselves 
from an alarming individual:  
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1. Keep would-be authoritarians off party ballots at election time, even when they 
can potentially deliver votes 
2. Root out extremists in the grass roots of their own ranks 
3. Avoid all alliances with antidemocratic parties and candidates 
4. Act to systematically isolate, rather than legitimize, extremists. This requires that 
politicians avoid acts that help to “normalize” or provide public respectability to 
public figures 
5. Whenever extremists emerge as serious electoral contenders, mainstream political 
parties must forge a united front to defeat them (p. 24-26) 
 
 By engaging in these actions, political parties may sacrifice electoral success, or a victory 
for their own political party, but they are considering democracy’s survival even more important 
than any political or legislative victory. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline several examples of 
cases where democracies have been spared because political parties acted as democracy’s 
gatekeepers. One recent example is from the 2016 French presidential election, where defeated 
conservative François Fillon called on conservatives to support center-left candidate Emmanuel 
Macron in order to prevent far-right candidate Marine Le Pen from emerging victorious. 
Although Fillon undoubtedly created unrest and anger amongst some in the conservative base, it 
also resulted in voters looking to Macron, who ultimately defeated Le Pen.  
In essence, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) theory of political parties as the gatekeepers of 
democracy sheds light on the very importance of the democratic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. However, it is also important for political parties to act as these gatekeepers in 
order to preserve not just what is explicitly granted in the Constitution, but democratic norms 
that act as the unwritten rules of the game (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). These unwritten rules 
reinforce constitutional rights in a democratic society, and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline 
two norms that have preserved America’s democracy: 1) “mutual toleration, or the understanding 
that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals,” and 2) “forbearance, or the idea 
that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives” (p. 8-9). 
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These democratic norms are not robustly defined and do not even serve as the foundation of 
America’s republic, but it has sustained it.  
Notably, however, the emergence of these two norms unfortunately came at the expense 
of African Americans’ progeress thus far. Mutual toleration arose only after the Civil War, when 
the Compromise of 1877 officially made Rutherford B. Hayes the president in exchange for the 
removal of federal troops from the South, effectively allowing Southern Democrats to strip 
federal protection of African Americans (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Henry Cabot Lodge’s 1890 
Federal Elections Bill, which “would have allowed federal oversight of congressional elections 
to ensure the realization of black suffrage,” also failed and thus ensured “[African Americans’] 
demise” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 124). The landmark decision in Plessy v. Ferguson during 
the same decade also exacerbated these racial separations—effectively legalizing separate but 
equal facilities for African Americans  (Plessy v. Ferguson, n.d.). Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
stressed that once each party “accepted each other as legitimate rivals,” bipartisan compromise 
could be facilitated in the following decades and thus lead to forbearance. This, however, did not 
come without the tragic collapse of progress for African Americans thus far. 
Holding up these democratic norms have allowed Americans to enjoy a stable democracy 
for the better part of the 20th century. However, the rise of Donald Trump has posed a unique 
challenge for this democracy, but also for the Republican Party, of which Donald Trump is the 
highest ranking member. Because of Donald Trump’s “outsider populist” characteristics and his 
adherence to authoritarian tendencies, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue the Republican Party 
should have acted as “gatekeepers” to preserve American democracy and its guardrails, or 
norms. Why did the Republican Party not act more strongly to prevent Donald Trump from 
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moving into the Oval Office? Furthermore, why does the Republican Party currently not critique 
the President more often after a speech or Twitter thread exuding authoritarian behavior? 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue there are two main motivations for political parties to 
refrain from checking a leader who threatens democracy. The first is that there is a belief that the 
political party in which the leader emerges believes it and its leaders can control the problematic 
figure. The second is the belief that there is enough overlap (or “common ground”)  between the 
political party and the leader to justify elevating him or her to power. And, if elected, they may 
be able to help use the figure in order to advance certain legislation or policies important to them. 
Although Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that it is imperative for establishment politicians to 
wholly denounce authoritarian leaders despite these two motives, they are still hurdles politicians 
must overcome. I also argue electoral success, or getting reelected, is a motivating factor behind 
supporting potentially antidemocratic figures. 
These two motivations seemed to motivate the Republican Party during and following the 
2016 election. Although Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) note that party elders tried to warn against 
Trump after his Super Tuesday victories, the modern primary system “left Republican leaders 
virtually weaponless to halt Trump’s rise. The barrage of attacks had little impact and possible 
even backfired when it counted: the voting booth” (p. 59).  Indeed, following Trump’s 
inauguration, it seemed Republican lawmakers were eager to move forward from the divisive 
primary and general election, and focus on reaping the benefits of a majority in both the House 
and Senate. For Republican lawmakers, the option to explicitly critique Donald Trump lost to 
advancing policy legislation.  
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) acknowledge that the notion of very public, high ranking 
Republican leaders encouraging its own base to perhaps cast a vote for Hillary Clinton in the 
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2016 general election would have been extraordinary. However, they insist it was still necessary 
in an effort to preserve American democracy and its norms (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). While 
there was a group of Republican elected officials who refused to endorse Donald Trump, only 
one elected official publicly endorsed Hillary Clinton: Congressman Richard Hanna of New 
York, and he was retiring (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).  
In this way, this thesis is first and foremost a study about democracy. Specifically, it 
focuses on America’s democracy and the role political parties take in shaping it through a series 
of unwritten norms Americans have come to take for granted. The period of time after 
Charlottesville was quite a clear opportunity for the Republican Party to act as a gatekeeper of 
democracy. It was their time to denounce Trump’s blatantly antidemocratic rhetoric that refused 
to unequivocally condemn the white supremacy and white nationalism encapsulated by the alt-
right at the rally.  
This framework yielded broad questions pertaining to the Republican response to the 
Charlottesville rally and how their responses indicate whether or not the party acted as 
democracy’s gatekeeper. Through what mediums did senators issue responses, and how many? 
What was the rhetorical nature of their response? Were they actively trying to normalize, isolate, 
root out extremists, etc.? According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), if Republican senators are 
acting as democray’s gatekeepers, the rhetorical nature of responses would have been a strong 
condemnation of both the rally and the President’s response to it. Furthermore, were there 
nuances in responses with regard to their repudiation of the alt-right and/or the President’s 
responses? As in, if there were senators who called out the President, did they all do this using 
similar rhetoric with similar strength, or were there different “ways” of criticizing the President? 
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The racial politics of the Republican Party 
Beyond the factors Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline as deterring politicians from 
speaking out against Trump (control and overlap) there are, likely, other forces shaping the 
Republican response to the Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump’s comments—forces driven 
primarily by the Republican Party’s relationship with race in America. As previously mentioned, 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) note the “tragic significance” of the causes leading up to the 
development of America’s two foremost democratic norms. The first is the demise of African 
Americans following federal troop removal from the South as a result of the Compromise of 
1877, ensuring African Americans would not receive federal protection. The second is the failure 
of Henry Cabot Lodge’s 1890 Federal Elections Bill, which ensured African Americans would 
not be able to feasibly excercise their right to vote. These two events, however, allowed political 
parties to see one another as legitimate rivals and promote institutional forbearance. Thus, the 
very foundation of America’s political parties, their relationships, and democratic norms 
emerged at the expense of African Americans’ progress. However, it is the Republican Party that 
has had particularly throughout history a fraught relationship with race. The Charlottesville rally 
not only posed as a way for Republicans to address Donald Trump and our democracy, but it was 
a vital moment to discuss race in America and their party. 
The Republican Party’s relationship with race is a complex narrative. It is worthwhile to 
take a deep dive into the historical context in which this relationship emerged in light of the 
Charlottesville rally. This historical narrative is also the context in which the seeds for a 
candidacy akin to Donald Trump’s are planted. The Republican Party has before had “populist 
outsider” candidates as described by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), and it is notable the ways in 
which the GOP dealt with them and their ideas. 
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The modern breed of conservatism, as we understand it today, came to fruition during the 
1950s and 1960s, when several prominent right-wing figures and organizations emerged and 
mobilized Americans within the Republican Party (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, Hemmer, 2016, 
McAdam & Kloos, 2014). Broadly, this was defined by a struggle between right-wing populist 
movements and more politically philosophical conservative movements (Critchlow & MacLean, 
2009, Hemmer, 2016). Berlet and Lyons (2000) define right-wing populism as “motivated or 
defined centrally by a backlash against liberation movements, social reform, or revolution” (p. 
5). Berlet and Lyons also use characteristics such as producerism (which characterizes elites as 
unproductive and “subordinate” groups as lazy or immoral), scapegoating, conspiracism, and an 
apocalyptic narrative. On the other hand, the conservative movement is defined by Berlet and 
Lyons (2000) as having an emphasis on “stability and order, and generally some combination of 
cultural traditionalism and ‘free-market’ economics” (p. 16). 
In 1964, Barry Goldwater’s run as the Republican nominee for president was a significant 
turning point for the modern Republican Party. Overall, Goldwater was an incredibly influential 
candidate for Republicans—McGirr (2015) details the sweeping effect he had on Orange 
County, California specifically, espousing individualism and anti-regulatory approaches 
particularly after New Deal policies were put in place. He also used anti-Washington rhetoric to 
appeal to this region, emphasizing that the West and Midwest took more risks and needed a 
candidate who reflected that. Moreover, he appealed to religious Americans by speaking to the 
breakdown of the family (McGirr, 2015). Although Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, McGirr argues his success is not equated with simply “white backlash” (p. 133), but 
instead “a broader conservative worldview based on limits to federal government control and a 
strong defense, as well as states’ rights in the arena of civil rights” (p. 134). Indeed, there is 
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scholarly debate on Goldwater and his precise effect on the Republican Party, with some arguing 
he had a more positive effect and others arguing the opposite (Critchlow & MacLean, 2009). 
Even with his broad success, his candidacy still revealed two distinct movements 
interacting with the Republican Party. One movement leaned into more right-wing populist 
ideals. The John Birch Society (founded by Robert Welch in 1958) is one example of a group 
that espoused these ideals. However, it is important to note they did not wholly capture the 
Republican Party, and their influence was therefore limited. Berlet and Lyons (2000) point out 
some of its more controversial aspects that had to do with implicit appeals to racial superiority, 
or at least perceived “white oppression.” Andrew (1997) calls the John Birch Society members 
the “advance guard of New Right populism,” in contrast to his comparison to William Buckley, 
“a patrician and a conservative”—a proponent of the conservative movement (which will be 
discussed at greater length) (p. 103). Berlet and Lyons (2000) argue the Society’s influence 
peaked during Goldwater’s nomination, revealing how right-wing populist movements can plant 
seeds in the Republican Party. Again, however, the Society’s influence, specifically, was still 
limited and certainly did not dominate the entire GOP narrative. 
In response to Goldwater’s candidacy, there was also pushback from some in the 
conservative movement, spearheaded by William F. Buckley, colleagues at Buckley’s 
publication the National Review, and other politicians in agreement with the conservative 
movement. McGirr (2015) describes distaste going so far as Governor Edmund G. Brown of 
California warning Americans that Goldwater’s speech had the “stench of fascism,” and was 
convinced Goldwater was the “hand-picked candidate” of the John Birch Society (p. 141). 
William Scranton’s (the Republican governor of Pennsylvania) staff wrote a letter to Goldwater, 
essentially accusing him of inviting “racial holocaust” (McGirr, 2015, p. 141). Other moderate 
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Republicans simply refused to stand behind Goldwater, such as Jacob Javits of New York, 
George Romney of Michigan, and Nelson Rockefeller, among others.  
1964, while proving to be a monumental turning point for conservative influence in 
national politics, ultimately resulted in Lyndon B. Johnson’s victory, at least in part a reflection 
of the Republican Party’s inability to reconcile these two competing movements. In light of this 
divide, Richard Nixon attempted to bridge the coalitions during a 1968 bid for the presidency 
(McGirr, 2015). 
         Walking into a still-divided Republican field, Nixon faced George Wallace, a 
segregationist running on the American Independent Party ticket (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). While 
Wallace was supported by the likes of the John Birch Society and the KKK, his support base 
spanned very much beyond this. He supported social welfare policies for white Americans and 
relied on coded racial appeals, as well as appeals to law-and-order, moral traditionalism, and the 
fear of centralized government (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). This worried Nixon’s campaign, which 
felt he may have trouble in the South because of Wallace’s tactics (Converse, Miller, Rusk, & 
 Wolfe, 1969). However, while Wallace could flourish in the Deep South with what McGirr 
(2015) describes as “populist racism,” it alienated broader groups of Republicans who shared 
“hostility” toward federal and liberal elites but rejected racial emphasis (p. 212). 
         Although Wallace experienced the most successful third-party candidacy since Teddy 
Roosevelt in 1912 with 13.5 percent of the vote, he was ultimately defeated by Richard Nixon, 
who was able to carry broader Republican support—especially after his vigorous campaigning 
for Goldwater in 1964 (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, McGirr, 2015). Nixon also recognized the 
important issues to gather this broad support—he took a hard line on “law-and-order” issues, 
attacked a larger “runaway” federal government, and criticized affirmative action (McGirr, 
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2015). He spoke of the “forgotten man,” and was able to “refashion” the Republican Party and, 
as a result, enjoyed the success that escaped Goldwater (McGirr, 2015). 
         Although Nixon was successful in 1968, the pressure to secure Wallace’s base was still 
prevalent in 1972. Thus, the Nixon campaign adopted the “Southern Strategy” to secure 
Wallace’s supporters (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Phillips, a former Nixon campaign aid, outlined in 
The Emerging Republican Majority (1969) the actual emerging Republican majority at the time, 
or the realignment of voters in the South and West to form a new Republican base. Phillips 
(1969) notes that in reality, the Southern Strategy started well before Nixon, with Goldwater 
swinging much of the Deep South Republican with “barely disguised racism,” but therefore 
sacrificing other states, including the Outer South1 (p. 170). Nixon and his campaign, in 1972, 
sought to utilize populist rhetoric and coded racial appeals to win the support of the “silent 
majority of middle Americans,” or a white ethnic constituency.  
         Furthermore, presidential candidates do not solely define the history of the Republican 
Party. During the time Nixon was campaigning for and running for president, another up-and-
coming Republican, actor Ronald Reagan, was running for governor of California. During the 
late 1960s, Reagan, like Nixon, also found success by focusing on an American electorate 
frustrated with protests, Democrats frustrated with their own party, and lower-middle class and 
middle-class whites (McGirr, 2015). Broadly, Reagan found a discontented working class and 
cultural changes he could tap into. In this way, Dallek (2004) notes his commitment to law-and-
order in response to race riots and a strong anti-communist stance. During this time Reagan also 
opposed the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis that this implementation was 
unconstitutional. Dallek (2004) additionally notes that the Reagan revolution was less about 
                                                
1 Phillips separates the South into the Deep South (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, 
and South Carolina) and the Outer South (Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, 
and Florida) (p. 157). 
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supply-side economics and more about social order—coded in subtle racial appeals to white 
Americans. Furthermore, after exit polls from 1980 – 2000 show Republicans’ southern 
congressional surge among white voters, Black and Black (2002) argue that Ronald Reagan’s 
presidency legitimized the GOP for white southerners. 
         Ronald Reagan, advancing in the Republican Party, eventually won the Republican 
nomination for president in 1980. The right-wing populist and conservative movements were still 
deeply influential during his presidential run—making it necessary for Reagan to appeal to a 
wide group of voters. However, Reagan was able to capitalize on the effects of the “Southern 
Strategy,” and indeed enjoy this widespread popularity. Broadly, McGirr (2015) describes how 
Reagan was able to appeal to the nexus of multiple movements fighting for influence over the 
Republican Party, but this was not without over twenty years of movements’ struggle to control 
the central narrative of the Party. And, it does not mean movements would not continue to 
express their disillusionment with the Republican Party. As Ronald Reagan prepared to leave the 
Oval Office, his vice president and eventual successor hit the campaign trail. 
George H.W. Bush faced the necessity to ensure the Southern realignment in favor of the 
Republican Party remained, as well as once again find the intersection of the variety of 
movements interacting with the Republican Party. Black and Black (2002) describe Bush’s 
capitalizing on the Southern realignment to secure his success there and Balz and Brownstein 
(1996) expand by noting his particular commitment to certain issues: gun control, defense, crime 
and drugs, the death penalty, and taxes. Like Reagan before him, he relied on issues that could 
hold white, Southern voters in the Republican Party, and it was successful—seven-tenths of 
white Southerners voted for Reagan in 1984 and two-thirds for Bush in 1988 (Black & Black, 
2000). 
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         The right-wing populist movements’ overlap with the Republican Party, too, affected 
Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign as it had influenced previous campaigns. Lee Atwater, 
Bush’s 1988 campaign manager, noted that the GOP’s hope for a Republican-majority South 
rested in the hands of populist voters (Balz & Brownstein, 1996). Balz and Brownstein (1996) 
pull a relevant quote from Atwater, who notes that culture and social issues would be crucial in 
gaining populists’ support in order to secure the Southern vote as a Republican vote:  
It is critical to our future success in the South that we understand the reasons for our 
inroads into the populist vote. Populists have always been liberal on economics. So long 
as the crucial issues were generally confined to economics — as during the New Deal — 
the liberal candidate could expect to get most of the populist vote. But populists are 
conservatives on most social issues, including abortion, gun control and ERA [Equal 
Rights Amendment]. Also, populists usually lean conservative on foreign policy and 
national security issues… Thus when Republicans are successful in getting certain social 
issues to the forefront, the populist vote is ours. (p. 216) 
  
Right-wing populism flared again in 1992, when Pat Buchanan challenged George H.W. 
Bush in the Republican primary, broadly espousing what Lyons (2017) describes as 
paleoconservative themes, or a criticism of military intervention, free trade, immigration, 
globalization, and the welfare state. Müller (2016) notes populism is inextricably tied to anti-
pluralism, and is always a form of identity politics. In this way, populism implies underlying 
racial tones, which rejects racial pluralism in the United States (either explicitly or implicitly) 
and can instead promote, for example, white Americans (and their protection as a homogeneous 
society) as a form of identity politics. 
As Berlet and Lyons (2000) note, paleoconservatives (led by Buchanan) wanted to 
“revive the anti-interventionist Right,” and portrayed Bush as “a symbol of the sinister Eastern 
elite” (p. 279-280). Buchanan and his campaign called Bush a “globalist” as a means to insult 
him, saying, “He is a globalist and we are nationalists. He believes in some Pax Universalis; we 
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believe in the Old Republic. He would put America’s wealth and power at the service of some 
vague New World Order; we will put America first” (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, p. 280). Buchanan 
also revived white racial nationalist ideas, writing, for example, in one column that the central 
problem with illegal immigrants was that they are “not English-speaking white people from 
Western Europe; they are Spanish-speaking brown and black people from Mexico, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean” (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, p. 280). 
Although Buchanan was not successful in his attempt to grab the reigns of the GOP in 
1992, nor was Bush as he sought reelection. The dawn of a new millennium eventually cleared 
the way for a new Republican candidate, George W. Bush, who would be able to navigate the 
variety of movements related to the Republican Party in 2000. Balz and Brownstein (1996) note 
George W. Bush recalling a political truth—“Lesson 101 in politics,” he said, “is never leave 
your base” (p. 244). 
George W. Bush’s framework in 2000 revolved around his campaigning as a 
“compassionate conservative,” hoping to soften the party’s ideological image (Black & Black, 
2000, p. 399). Bush knew he could not afford to lose his white and Southern base, a base 
preceding him that was built over almost three decades. His “compassionate conservative” 
strategy was quite successful, using the “noun to reassure white conservatives” and the 
“adjective to attract white moderates” (Black & Black, 2002, p. 399). 
After his victory in 2000, Bush’s presidency was permanently altered by terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, which reestablished ideals of interventionism and anti-isolationism 
within the Republican Party and country (Lyons, 2017). These reestablished ideals within the 
Republican Party quieted right-wing populist movements, or paleoconservatives from 
Buchannan’s multiple presidential bids. 
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It is in this history that we can begin to see the Republican Party historically assuming its 
role as a gatekeeper of democracy—it had broadly managed through the 20th century to avoid 
leaders who quite blatantly challenged democracy, such as George Wallace. However, this does 
not mean these figures did not try to utilize the Republican Party as a way to manifest power. 
This history also, obviously, explains the buildup to the Republican Party’s relationship with the 
issue of race today.  
The appreciation of why elite political response to the alt-right and the events of 
Charlottesville matters is also rooted in a foundational understanding of what the alt-right 
specificaly is. In a sweeping overview of the movement, Lyons (2017) notes the term itself was 
created in 2008 by Richard Spencer3 to encapsulate a group of far right-wing individuals at odds 
with the conservative establishment. Spencer also founded AlternataiveRight.com and the 
National Policy Institute, a white nationalist think tank, as well as a number of other outlets to 
espouse the alt-right’s emerging ideology (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Since then, the alt-right has 
used the Internet as a way to mobilize. The movement itself is rooted in white nationalism, an 
umbrella term that encompasses white identity politics, the belief that America is an inherently 
white nation, and isolationism (Kreiss & Mason, 2017). Also, although the alt-right holds a 
grievance with establishment Republican Party, they demonstrate some influence due to their 
targeting Republican voters to join the movement (Hood, 2016, Kreiss & Mason, 2017). Notably, 
although the movement is grassroots and will inherently insist on falling back on its own 
members, it looks toward Donald Trump as a figure who can help advance their cause and 
generally supported him over every other Republican in the 2016 election. 
                                                
3 The Southern Poverty Law Center (n.d.) describes Spencer as “one of the country’s most 
successful young white nationalist leaders” who “advocates for an Aryan homeland for the 
supposedly dispossessed white race and calls for ‘peaceful ethnic cleansing’ to halt the 
‘deconstruction’ of European Culture.” 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
In this chapter, I first outline the two research questions that drive this study. I then define 
my sample and explain how I collected the data. Finally, I discuss my methods of analysis, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, and limitations. 
 
Research Questions 
To begin, it is necessary to explain again what I am looking for and analyzing. This study 
asks how Republican senators—a group of elite, influential Republicans—chose to respond to 
the Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump’s response to the rally. Thus, this study is broadly 
separated by two distinct research questions that can be answered and analyzed quantitatively 
and qualitatively: 
 
RQI: How did the Republican Party respond to the Charlottesville rally? 
 
I expect to find Republican senators broadly denouncing the violence and the obviously 
racist behavior at the Charlottesville rally. However, given the Republican Party’s history 
with race and electoral coalitions (i.e—a white base), it is my expectation that the 
Republican Party will refrain from addressing race after the Charlottesville rally, as it 
could lead to backlash. I expect there will be some things that likely influence how a 
senator responded to the Charlottesville rally, such as a senator’s state’s geographical 
location, how the state’s constituents voted in 2016, reelection year, and if the senator is 
running for reelection. 
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State (geographic location): I expect Southern senators in particular to be less inclined 
to criticize the President given the South’s historical tendency to use race as a factor to 
attract white votes. I define the South as one of four regions in the United States 
(Northeast, South, West, and Midwest) according to the United States Census Bureau-
designated regions (Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, n.d.). Levitsky 
and Ziblatt’s (2018) theoretical framework does not address the Republican Party’s 
history with race, which is why I built this second framework to help understand and 
ultimately answer these questions.   
 
State (2016 results): I expect that a senator would try to find suitable overlap with 
Trump because of his winning performance in their state during the 2016 Republican 
primary and the general election (only three out of 52 senators represent a state that did 
not swing for Trump in 2016). This is also related to electoral success. I expect a senator 
would avoid criticizing the President in order to preserve the votes of their constituency 
that also put Trump in the Oval Office. A senator’s state with regard to Trump’s 
performance there in the 2016 election implicates the level of policy risk (failure to 
overlap and pass legislation) or electoral risk they face should they criticize Donald 
Trump. On the contrary, if Trump did not sweep that senator’s state in the GOP primary 
or general election, I expect that senator would be less concerned about the party’s 
agenda than other concerns about democracy. 
 
Reelection year: I expect reelection year, again viewed through the lens of Levitsky and 
Ziblatt’s (2018) theory, would reflect senators’ willingness or unwillingness to value their 
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role as democracy’s gatekeepers over phenomenon like control, policy overlap, and 
electoral success. I expect that the earlier a senator’s reelection year, the more a senator 
may want to find “common ground” on policy and legislation with Donald Trump. This 
is partially because they also face electoral pressure of getting reelected by a constituency 
that voted in favor of the President in 2016. Reelection year is also, of course, related to a 
senator’s state and its 2016 results, outlined above. If a senator’s state did not swing for 
Trump in the 2016 GOP primary and/or the general election, I expect the reelection year 
would hypothetically matter less, as Trump has already proved to be less popular in that 
particular state. 
 
Seeking reelection?: I expect to see those who are not running for reelection abandon 
their quest for overlap with the President and choose, instead, to criticize him on the basis 
of “having nothing to lose.” It will be an important indicator for how the Republican 
Party is or is not adequately acting as democracy’s gatekeeper. Like reelection year, I 
expect whether or not a senator is seeking reelection to largely play into their amount of 
desired  “overlap” that Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) describe, and the lack of commitment 
to “electoral success” (or reelection) that I define. It is useful to track which senators are 
or are not running for reelection—this could have an impact on their likelihood of 
stronger condemnation and denouncement. 
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RQ2: How did the Republican Party respond to Donald Trump remarks following the 
rally? 
 
I expect Republican senators to not denounce Donald Trump becaue of what Levitsky 
and Ziblatt (2018) call “control” and “overlap.” “Control” is the idea that politicians can 
control figures with potentially antidemocratic behavior, and they thus do not need to 
publicly say or do anything. “Overlap” is the idea that senators seek political success in 
the form of policy and legislative victories, and that in order to achieve this, it is 
important to seek “overlap”—or common ground—with the potentially antidemocratic 
figure. I also expect senators to avoid denouncement of Trump because they seek 
electoral success (getting reelected) as much as political success. If a senator’s 
constituency are a majority Donald Trump fans, it could mean a losing election year for 
that senator should they choose to critcize him. However, I do not expect Republican 
senators to be totally absent of any criticism. I anticipate senators with specific 
characteristics to be likelier to criticize Donald Trump than others, including senators 
with a non-2018 election year, senators whose state did not swing for Trump in the 2016 
Republican primary, and/or senators whose state did not swing for Trump in the 2016 
general election. These senators, in particular, are not as committed to overlap because 
they have ample time left in their term to achieve policy victories. They can also still 
achieve electoral success without Donald Trump either because their reelection is not for 
some time (and the rally would be forgotten news by then) or because their constituency 
does not support him as much as other senators.     
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It is necessary to analyze the responses to Donald Trump’s remarks as well as responses 
to the rally. Not only are the two inextricably related, but the responses to the President 
are a clear example of how Republican senators are or aren’t acting as gatekeepers of 
democracy. It is important to consider how senators not only tackle the important issues 
of white supremacism and violence on display at the Charlottesville rally, but also 
Trump’s apparent toleration of them through his refusal to explicitly denounce it 
immediately. Their responses are an important indicator of the strength of democratic 
norms and ideals in party leaders. 
 
Building a sample of Republicans 
Before diving further into specific quantitative and qualitative methods to answer these 
research questions, it is first important to discuss why I am analyzing Republican senators in 
particular. Although a wide range of Republicans—both office holders and non-office holding 
influencers—responded to the Charlottesville rally, I decided to analyze only the Republican 
senators in office during the time of the Charlottesville rally in the interest of creating a cohesive, 
coherent dataset of Republicans to analyze for this study. 
 Furthermore, Republican senators are a cross-section of the Republican Party in terms of 
their ideology. Senators as libertarian as Rand Paul caucus with senators as far-right as Tea Party 
Republican Ted Cruz. All of these nuances make senators a worthwhile way to study what may 
be at play more broadly within the GOP. It is also important to note that senators are worthwhile 
to study because of their undeniable inflence due to their elected status. Furthermore, senators 
represent an entire state, so they are likely to be more moderate and broadly representative than a 
member in the House. Finally, Republican senators encompass a variety of party leadership, 
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including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a number of 2016 presidential candidates, 
the 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain, and likely future presidential nominees. 
This is important—not only do Senate Republicans vary in ideology, but there is a variety of 
“publicity.” For example, some are future party leaders, some are more “newsworthy” and 
frequently appear on TV, and some have a bigger influence on journalists and media coverage.  
Below, Figure 1 shows each Republican senator, broken down by their state and 
reelection year. A “N” indicates that a senator will not be seeking reelection. A “Y” indicates 
that a senator will be seeking reelection. Finally, a “U” indicates it is unclear because that senator 
has not announced if he or she is seeking reelection, most likely due to the fact that their 
reelection year is not until either 2020 or 2022. A senator was assigned a “N,” “Y,” or “U” based 
on their status at the time of the Charlottesville rally. For example, at the time of the 
Charlottesville rally, Senator Strange from Alabama was actively seeking reelection, even 
though he ultimately lost to Roy Moore in the Alabama Republican primary. 
  
Figure 1: Republican senators  
Name State 
Reelection Year — Seeking 
Reelection Y/N/U 
Luther J. Strange III 
 Alabama 2018 - Y 
Jeff Flake 
 Arizona 2018 – Y 
Roger Wicker 
 Mississippi 2018 - Y 
Deb Fischer 
 Nebraska 2018 - Y 
Dean Heller 
 Nevada 2018 - Y 
Bob Corker 
 Tennessee 2018 - Y 
Ted Cruz 
 Texas 2018 - Y 
Orrin Hatch Utah 2018 - U 
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John Barrasso 
 Wyoming 2018 - Y 
Daniel S. Sullivan 
 Alaska 2020 – U 
Tom Cotton 
 Arkansas 2020 - U 
Cory Gardner 
 Colorado 2020 - U 
David Perdue 
 Georgia 2020 - U 
Jim Risch 
 Idaho 2020 - U 
Joni Ernst 
 Iowa 2020 - U 
Pat Roberts 
 Kansas 2020 - U 
Mitch McConnell 
 Kentucky 2020 - U 
Bill Cassidy 
 Louisiana 2020 - U 
Susan Collins 
 Maine 2020 -U 
Thad Cochran 
 Mississippi 2020 - U 
Steve Daines 
 Montana 2020 - U 
Ben Sasse 
 Nebraska 2020 - Y 
Thom Tillis 
 North Carolina 2020 -U 
Jim Inhofe 
 Oklahoma 2020 - U 
Lindsey Graham 
 South Carolina 2020 - U 
Mike Rounds 
 South Dakota 2020 - U 
Lamar Alexander 
 Tennessee 2020 - U 
John Cornyn 
 Texas 2020 - Y 
Shelley Moore Capito 
 West Virginia 2020 - U 
Mike Enzi 
 Wyoming 2020 - U 
Richard Shelby Alabama 2022 - U 
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Lisa Murkowski 
 Alaska 2022 - U 
John McCain 
 Arizona 2022 - U 
John Boozman 
 Arkansas 2022 - U 
Marco Rubio 
 Florida 2022 - U 
Johnny Isakson 
 Georgia 2022 - U 
Mike Crapo 
 Idaho 2022 - U 
Todd C. Young 
 Indiana 2022 - U 
Chuck Grassley 
 Iowa 2022 - U 
Jerry Moran 
 Kansas 2022 - U 
Rand Paul 
 Kentucky 2022 - U 
John Neely Kennedy 
 Louisiana 2022 - U 
Roy Blunt 
 Missouri 2022 - U 
Richard Burr 
 North Carolina 2022 - N 
John Hoeven 
 North Dakota 2022 - U 
Rob Portman 
 Ohio 2022 - U 
James Lankford 
 Oklahoma 2022 - U 
Pat Toomey 
 Pennsylvania 2022 - U 
Tim Scott 
 South Carolina 2022 - U 
John Thune 
 South Dakota 2022 - U 
Mike Lee 
 Utah 2022 - U 
Ron Johnson 
 Wisconsin 2022 - N 
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Collecting the data 
I compiled data about each Republican senator: their state, what candidate won their state 
in the 2016 Republican presidential primary, if Trump won their state in the 2016 presidential 
election, their reelection year, and whether or not they will be seeking reelection. These criteria 
may indicate the degree of policy overlap and electoral success pressure senators face. They are 
indicators a senator might not actively seek as much “overlap” with the President and his 
administration. 
I also recorded whether or not a senator explicitly or implicitly criticized the president, if 
at all. A senator explicitly criticized the prseident if he or she mentioned Trump by his name or 
title and proceeded to criticize him for his remarks. A senator implicitly criticizing Trump 
required a bit more interpretation. In order to determine implicit critique, I carefully took into 
account the number of responses and the timing of the responses. Recall the timeline of President 
Trump’s three separate occasions of responding to the Charlottesville rally. The President’s first 
response on August 12 garnered attention for his language that condemned the violence “on 
many sides,” which many saw as a pass for the white nationalist marchers because of its lack of 
explicit denouncement. While the President did call out specific racist hate groups two days later 
on August 14, he quickly retreated to his original language in a press conference on August 15, 
where he remarked that there was “blame on both sides” and that there “were very fine people, 
on both sides” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017). Most likely, if a senator 
chose to respond for the first time days after the rally (during the time Donald Trump was still 
remarking on the rally) or issue another response, particularly one more strongly condemning the 
rally, it is quite likely the senator was hoping to criticize the President without doing so 
explicitly. For example, logically, it does not make sense for a senator to issue a statement on 
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August 12, as the rally was happening, and then follow up with a more specific statement on 
August 15, (three days after the rally’s end, but the same day as Trump’s third statement) unless 
responding to the President specifically was the goal. Furthermore, responses that were 
particularly sharp on August 12 or August 13 (immediately following the rally) with regard to its 
asseration that it is exceedingly important to unequivocally denounce the groups and behavior at 
the Charlottesville rally may also be an indicator of “implicit” criticism. 
Below, Figure 2 shows my compilation of this data that will help determine if any factors 
were significant indicators of a Republican senator’s likelihood of forgoing things like “overlap,” 
and acting like the gatekeepers of democray that Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline. 
 
Figure 2: Characteristics of Republican Senators 
Name State Region 
Reelecti-
on year 
Seeking 
Reelect-
ion Y/N 
Ran for 
Preside-
nt in 
2016? 
Y/N 
State for 
____ in 
2016 
GOP 
primary: 
State for 
Trump 
in 2016 
General? 
Y/N 
Bob 
Corker 
 
Tennessee South 2018 N N Trump Y 
Chuck 
Grassley 
 
Iowa Midwest 2022 U N Cruz Y 
Cory 
Gardner Colorado West 2020 U N Cruz N 
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Figure 2: Characteristics of Republican Senators (cont.) 
Name 
# Press 
Releases 
or 
Stateme-
nts # Tweets 
# 
Retweets 
# FB 
Posts 
TOTAL 
# RESP-
ONSES 
Criticize 
Trump 
by name 
(explicit-
ly)? Y/N 
Criticize 
Trump 
with 
timing 
(implicit-
ly)? Y/N 
Bob 
Corker 
 
0 1 1 0 2 N N 
Chuck 
Grassley 
 
0 1 1 0 2 N N 
Cory 
Gardner 0 4 0 1 5 Y Y 
 
In addition to collecting quantitative data, I also inductively analyzed responses to draw 
out qualitative themes in these senators’ rhetoric. In total, I analyzed responses from 52 
senators—each Republican senator in office during the Charlottesville rally. There were 333 
total responses. For the purpose of this study, I defined “responses” as press releases or 
statements on a senator’s official website, tweets, retweets, or Facebook posts. While senators 
also may have participated in TV or radio interviews, it is likely that that senator’s official 
narrative or choice of rhetoric in those interviews was also reflected in their online 
communication so there is no room for misinterpretation from outside actors on how Republican 
senators tackle the topics from the Charlottesville rally. Furthermore, it is likely senators would 
have chosen to use similar communications tactics offline to maintain a consistent message. 
Thus, analyzing anything more than web-based responses would have presumably been 
repetitive and not revealing of new phenomenon. Finally, speeches on the Senate floor couldn’t 
be considered, as the Senate was out of session during this time frame. The Congressional 
Record also reflects that there were no such speeches given on the floor (Congressional Record, 
2017).  
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Below, Figure 3 shows a sample of the qualitative data from one senator.  
Figure 3: Online Responses of Senators 
Name State 
Reelection 
year – 
Seeking 
Reelection 
Y/N/U 
Release/Retweet
/Tweet/FB Post 
- Date - Account Text 
Jeff 
Flake Arizona 2018 - Y 	 	
   
TWEET - 
August 12, 2017 
2:54 PM - 
@JeffFlake 
 
The #WhiteSupremacy in #Charlottesville 
does not reflect the values of the America I 
know. Hate and bigotry have no place in 
this country. 
 
 
   
RETWEET - 
August 12, 2017 
- @JeffFlake 
RT @CoryGardener: Praying for those hurt 
& killed today in Charlottesville. This is 
nothing short of domestic terrorism & 
   
 should be named as such. 
Mr. President - we must call evil by its 
name. These were white supremacists and 
this was domestic terrorism. 
 
 
   
TWEET - 
August 15, 2017 
7:12 PM - 
@JeffFlake 
We can't accept excuses for white 
supremacy & acts of domestic terrorism. 
We must condemn. Period. 
 
 
   
TWEET - 
August 16, 2017 
12:06 AM - 
@JeffFlake 
We can’t claim to be the party of Lincoln if 
we equivocate in condemning white 
supremacy 
 
 
   
STATEMENT - 
August 15, 2017 
WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-
Ariz.) today released the following 
statement regarding the president’s most 
recent comments on the violence in 
Charlottesville: 
 
“We cannot accept excuses for white 
supremacy and acts of domestic terrorism. 
We must condemn them. Period.” 
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RETWEET - 
August 15, 2017 
- 
@SenFlakeStaff 
RT @JeffFlake: We can't accept excuses for 
white supremacy & acts of domestic 
terrorism. We must condemn. Period. 
 
 
Analyzing the data: quantitative and qualitative approaches 
To begin my analysis, I first took a quantitative appoach to analyze data on whether a 
Republican senator’s state, what candidate won their state in the 2016 Republican presidential 
primary, if Trump won their state in the 2016 presidential election, their reelection year, and 
whether or not they will be seeking reelection shaped a senator’s response.  
Without delving too extensively into findings now, it was clear that no solid patterns 
emerged from this data, particularly with regard to the theoretical framework of political parties 
as democracy’s gatekeeprs. Therefore, I needed to do a qualitative interpretive analysis in order 
to inductively find themes through the lens of Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) framework and the 
historical racial narrative of the GOP. 
From here, I analyzed responses from August 11 – August 19 in order to identify 
rhetorical trends and overall themes of the senators’ responses. This time frame includes both 
days of the rally and the administration’s three responses. Again, responses may have included 
tweets, retweets, Facebook posts, and press releases or official statements. The rally ended on 
August 12, so this time frame also gave senators one full week to respond to the Charlottesville 
events.  
This qualitative content analysis entailed inductively analyzing the data, which included 
analyzing senators’ word choice, level of critique of the rally, and rhetorical strategies. I also 
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analyzed the senators’ responses to President Trump and gauged their criticism of his three 
separate remarks. I have already detailed my process of determining their explicit or implicit 
criticism above. Through this inductive analysis I constructed a set of broad themes that define 
the Republican senatorial response to the Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump. Again, without 
preemptively discussing findings, this qualitative content analysis, unlike the quantitative 
analysis, allowed me to discover and analyze the senators that did explicitly criticize the 
president or discuss race more openly, acting as Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) gatekeepers of 
democracy, and consider their unique characteristics. 
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge certain limitations of the data. There is an 
inherent challenge of analyzing online responses: almost anything online can be deleted or 
changed, and a web user would not necessarily know whether it had been changed or deleted, nor 
how. While it was less than one year after the rally, this data was still collected retroactively, 
thus it is possible that some responses may have been deleted or altered in the meantime.  
 
Chapter 4: Findings 
 In an effort to understand which senators would fit into Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) 
framework of political parties as democracy’s gatekeepers and why, I first turned to my 
quantitative data to assess potential patterns of responses. I considered my characteristics of a 
senator’s state, what candidate won their state in the 2016 Republican presidential primary, if 
Trump won their state in the 2016 presidential election, their reelection year, and whether or not 
they will be seeking reelection.  
 As detailed above, a senator’s state, as it is geographically located in the United States, 
seemed to be the characteristic that was the strongest indicator a senator would criticize Donald 
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Trump. Figure 4, below, illustrates that a senator was likelier to explicitly criticize the President 
if he or she is from the Western region of the United States, and less likely to explicitly criticize 
if he or she is from the Southern region of the United States. This does reflect the framework of 
the Republican Party and its relationship with race, as Republicans in the South have particularly 
used white racial supriority as a specific tactic to appeal to voters in the past. However, what is 
more unclear is why Western senators were that much liklier to explicitly criticize POTUS than 
Midwestern senators as well. Furthermore, both senators from the Northeast did not explicitly 
criticize the President—a region of the United States that typically swings Democratic. These 
two phenomenon push back against my expectation that geographic location plays a significant 
role in determining strength of response. Again, I determined a state’s region based on the 
Census Bureau-designated regions and classifications of each state (Census Regions and 
Divisions of the United States, n.d.). 
Figure 4: Explicit critique based on region  
Region % Explicitly critiqued (out of that region) 
South  ~13% — 3 out of 24 
Midwest ~15% — 2 out of 13 
West ~54% — 7 out of 13 
Northeast 0%** — 0 out of 2 
**There are only two Republican senators from Northeastern states — a sample size much 
smaller than the other regions. 
 
 Even less substantive patterns emerge from the rest of the characteristics. To begin, 
because only two senators had announced in August 2017 that they would not seek reelection, it 
was impossible to test if this characteristic was a determining factor for addressing the research 
questions. With regard to reelection year, there does not seem to be any correlation between this 
and explicitly criticizing Trump. Indeed, it seemed to be entirely random. While those with a 
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2022 reelection were most likely to criticize the President, in line with what I expected, it was 
not such an obvious pattern that I felt it could explain this critique by itself. Figure 5 illustrates 
this. 
Figure 5: Explicit critique based on reelection year  
Reelection Year % Explicitly critiqued (out of that year) 
2018  ~22% — 2 out of 9 
2020 ~19% — 4 out of 21 
2022 ~32% — 7 out of 22 
 
 The trend of weak quantitative patterns to explain Republican senators’ responses within 
this study’s theoretical framework continues with 2016 election characteristics. Senators whose 
state did not swing for Trump in the 2016 Republican primary were not drastically more likely to 
explicitly criticize Donald Trump. Furthermore, in the 2016 general election, only three senators’ 
states did not swing for Trump, rendering it difficult to ensure if this was a meaningful 
characteristic or not. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate these findings. 
 
Figure 6: Explicit critique based on 2016 Republican primary results 
Swing for Trump in 2016 
Republican primary? % Explicitly critiqued (out of that year) 
Yes  ~33% — 7 out of 21 
No ~24% — 6 out of 25 
 
 
Figure 7: Explicit critique based on 2016 general results 
Swing for Trump in 2016 
Republican primary? % Explicitly critiqued (out of that year) 
Yes  ~33% — 1 out of 3 
No ~23% — 12 out of 52 
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In this way, none of the characteristics seemed to explain patterns in response, especially 
in regard to my theoretical framework. It is for this reason I turned to an inductive, qualitative 
study in order to identify more rhetorical nuance in response, and analyze those senators that 
criticized the President in some way.  
After developing broad, qualitative themes, it was evident that Senate Republican 
responses reflect that the Republican Party recognized the Charlottesville rally as an event of 
great enormity and importance for the nation as a whole, therefore warranting some sort of 
response. To not respond would have presumably been a political risk, but it appears it was 
important to respond without mentioning the President. While themes suggest senators were 
attempting to address the nation as one, united country, they also suggest senators found it 
necessary to keep the Republican Party agenda in mind—or what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
call “overlap,” the avoidance of criticizing an antidemocratic leader in hopes they can instead 
focus on agreeing on policy. To criticize Trump, the highest ranking Repulican, would have also 
been a political risk. In other words, responses were seemingly about policy and the motivation 
to pass Republican legislation during an opportune time of holding a congressional majority. In 
even fewer words: Republican senators were attempting to successfully “overlap,” with President 
Trump. I also argue Republican senators avoid breaking with the President—the leader of their 
party—to subsequently avoid electoral risk, or the risk of not being reelected. 
 While the overall responses are varied, the broad theme is that, in response to a leader 
who threatened democracy and its norms (Trump), the Republican Party failed to act as 
gatekeepers of democracy. This was likely primarily driven by a belief that there is enough 
overlap between the leader and the party to use it to their advantage and pass legislation, as well 
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as a belief that criticizing him would jeopardize Republican reelection. Even implicit critique of 
the President was a failure to unequivocally denounce antidemocratic behaviors. 
 The qualitative themes emerging from the inductive analysis can be broadly characterized 
into three separate sections: 
1. “We as the American people…”: This theme is most generally about Republican 
senators’ attempt to address race in America through a unified, American front. 
Although they do not address it in terms of the GOP, they do deounce white 
supremacy, white nationalism, and general racism in terms of the United Stats as a 
whole, which is not necessarily a bad thing. However, they particularly avoided 
discussing it in relation to their party, and in this way it does fit into the historical 
narrative of the GOP and race. 
2.  Criticism without explicitly criticizing: This theme encapsulated the tendency to 
implicitly criticize the President for his remarks following the Charlottesville rally, 
using rhetoric such as “call it by it’s name,” “no place” and “no room,” and 
“condemn” to describe the racism and violence, oftentimes at a time that indicates a 
senator’s attempt to criticize the President for not being so explicit. However, as I 
mentioned before, this is still a failure to act as democracy’s gatekeepers. 
3. “Mr. President…”: This theme includes all 13 senators who explicitly criticized the 
President, acting as democracy’s gatekeepers that Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
describe. These senators are important to characterize and contextualize in order to 
understand the reasons some Republican senators acted as gatekeepers of democracy, 
but not all. Here, it becomes apparent that the bottom-line is not quantifiable 
characteristics, but a status of seniority or Republican Party leadership. 
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“We as the American people...” 
One prevalent theme in Republican senators’ responses to the Charlottesville rally was to 
address the reader as an American, use the pronoun “we,” and generally attempt to foster a sense 
of national unity. “This is bigotry. This is racism. These are views we as the American people 
should reject,” is what Senator Steve Daines of Montana tweeted midday on August 12, as the 
events in Charlottesville were unfolding (Daines, 2017). Within this theme, Republican senators 
attempt to address race and racism, but typically not in relation to the Republian Party and its 
historic grappling with these topics. 16 senators, out of 52 total, utilized the “We as the 
American people…” tactic in their responses.  
Where this theme differs in its usage among senators is its use as a mechanism to avoid 
explicitly repudiating a president who is threatening democratic norms. In sum: this could be a 
way to call out and denounce racism without repudiating Donald Trump. In this way, fostering a 
sense of national unity and a nonpartisan call-to-action could be a way to not completely lose 
Republican appeal, and potentially soften the potential blowback. Out of the 16 senators who 
utilized this tactic, 11 of them did not criticize the President. 
Broadly, seemingly because there was a heavy emphasis on addressing one American 
people, senators did not utilize partisan language. In fact, the vast majority of senators’ responses 
lack any trace of explicit partisanship—a rarity during a time when political parties are becoming 
more polarized and voters are less likely to describe themselves as having moderate or mixed 
political views (Pew Research Center, 2014). Senators generally did not suggest it was solely the 
Democrats’ or Republicans’ responsibility to denounce the events in Charlottesville. Instead, this 
theme seems to suggest the Charlottesville rally was more than a simple partisan divide in 
America. “We as the American people…” suggests that senators recognized that the 
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Charlottesville rally marked an important time in American history that they should respond to in 
a way that addresses the nation as a whole versus individual political parties. Consider Senator 
Bob Corker’s tweet from August 12, when the rally was still going on. “We stand united against 
the violence and hatred in #Charlottesville and pray for the victims of the attacks,” (Corker, 
2017). Senator Corker was not one of the senators who explicitly criticized the President.  
 Here, Senator Corker is clearly condemning violence and hate more broadly. However, 
he does not addess the GOP, nor does he denounce the President for democratic norm-violating 
behavior. In this way, he is failing to act as America’s democratic gatekeeper. While he is 
acknowledging and condemning the hate and violence at Charlottesville, he does not take the 
opportunity to address the important figure—Donald Trump—who is perhaps fostering, or at 
least not clearly denouncing, the very behavior he has criticized in this tweet. 
 Again, however, sometimes senators who did explicitly criticize the President also did so 
in conjunction with “We as the American people…” Although they were not the majority of this 
group, it is still worth noting. Senator Tim Scott, who goes on to criticize the President in later 
posts, tweeted on August 12: “We must stand together to condemn racism & violence. We are 
the American family, and will not be divided by hate. #Charlottesville” (Scott, 2017). 
 I have already noted that this theme is a way to address race in America without being 
specific to the Republican Party, which I will discuss in more detail soon. However, it is worth 
taking a deep dive into other reasons why senators used such patriotic language. Why were 
senators eager to address the audience as “Americans,” “we,” “us,” and “our” when they could 
have addressed Republicans and Democrats, seemingly a norm nowadays? One such explanation 
is that the Charlottesville rally was interpreted as an “outside threat to the nation.” 
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An outside threat to the nation 
The attempt to build a united American front via response rhetoric first suggests that the 
Charlottesville rally was perceived as an attack or threat to the nation, prompting rhetoric that 
addresses the audience as Americans versus a member of a smaller group, such as a political 
party. Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina posted the following statement to his Facebook page 
on August 15: 
The greatest, underappreciated threat we face is the unraveling that occurs from the inside 
out. We must counter it with the blunt force of unity. 
 
We are Americans. From all walks of life. From many different backgrounds. Everyone 
working towards the American Dream. Nowhere in that dream is there room for racism. 
Nowhere in that dream is there room for hate. It should go without saying that there is 
absolutely no room for violence. Not in Charleston. Not in Charlottesville. Not in 
Alexandria, or anywhere else a hate-filled individual decides to show his or her face. 
 
My op-ed in USA TODAY -  
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/08/14/fight-hatred-fear-domestic-terror-
with-american-ideals-tim-scott-column/564755001/ (Scott, 2017). 
 
 Scholars such as Li and Brewer (2004) have explained that after 9/11, the United States 
experienced a high level of national unity and national identification. More broadly, Li and 
Brewer (2004) assert that this is not a phenomenon solely observed after 9/11. In fact, patriotism 
and nationalism both increase in terms of social identification in response to an outside threat (Li 
& Brewer, 2004).  
Mihas (2005) points to specific rhetorical strategies President Bush and his 
administration used after he won his 2004 reelection campaign. First, he used language such as 
“To serve all Americans” and “to reach out to the whole nation” as a promise to uphold 
bipartisanship, particularly after the catastrophic events of 9/11 that defined the early years of his 
presidency (Mihas, 2005). In terms of military strength, he said things like: “The military has 
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brought justice to the enemy” (Mihas, 2005). Notably, there is one common “enemy” for the 
entire nation and nothing intending to connotate a partisan divide in America, or one particular 
political party as the “enemy.”  
Bush did not just employ this “We as the American people…” rhetorical strategy around 
the time of the 2004 election, but also immediately in the wake of 9/11, an outside, physical 
attack to the nation. Below are excerpts of his remarks on September 11 as he addressed the 
nation. 
… Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot 
touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel 
of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon 
for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. 
Today, our nation saw evil -- the very worst of human nature -- and we responded with 
the best of America [emphasis added]. With the daring of our rescue workers, with the 
caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they 
could…  
 
… I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly 
condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world 
leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance. America and our 
friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we 
stand together to win the war against terrorism [emphasis added]. 
 
Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds 
have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I 
pray they will be comforted by a Power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in 
Psalm 23: 
 
“Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are 
with me.” 
 
This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice 
and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time 
[emphasis added]. None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend 
freedom and all that is good and just in our world. 
 
Thank you. Good night. And God bless America (George W. Bush 9/11 Address to the 
Nation, 2017).  
 
 47 
Bush clearly avoided identifying his audience as anything other than Americans, using 
pronouns such as “we” and “our” in “... we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity 
in the world,” and “our nation saw evil -- the very worst of human nature -- and we responded 
with the best of America” (George W. Bush 9/11 Address to the Nation, 2017). Furthermore, he 
even explicitly acknowledged the unification of America following the attacks: “This is a day 
when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace” (George 
W. Bush 9/11 Address to the Nation, 2017). 
Although Mihas (2005) critiques Bush’s rhetoric against his record as president (for 
example, utilizing bipartisan rhetoric following 9/11 and the 2004 election, yet having a right-
leaning record of legislation during his tenure), it is important to remember that patriotism and 
nationalism is observed on both sides of the aisle following an outside threat, regardless of 
partisanship that may show in other political and legislative battles (Li & Brewer, 2005). After 
the United States’ Navy SEAL Team Six killed Osama Bin Laden—the leader of al Qaeda who 
orchestrated the 9/11 attacks—in 2011, President Obama addressed the nation. Although the 
killing of Osama Bin Laden was seen as a national victory, it still invoked memories of 9/11—
what is perceived as the worst outside threat and attack to America in its modern history. Obama 
utilized similar rhetorical strategies as that of Bush, calling on Americans as one American 
people in the wake of an attack and threat to the nation. 
... On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the American people came together 
[emphasis added].  We offered our neighbors a hand, and we offered the wounded our 
blood.  We reaffirmed our ties to each other, and our love of community and country.  On 
that day, no matter where we came from, what God we prayed to, or what race or 
ethnicity we were, we were united as one American family… [emphasis added] 
 
… And tonight, let us think back to the sense of unity [emphasis added] that prevailed on 
9/11.  I know that it has, at times, frayed.  Yet today’s achievement is a testament to the 
greatness of our country and the determination of the American people. 
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The cause of securing our country is not complete.  But tonight, we are once again 
reminded that America can do whatever we set our mind to [emphasis added].  That is the 
story of our history, whether it’s the pursuit of prosperity for our people, or the struggle 
for equality for all our citizens; our commitment to stand up for our values abroad, and 
our sacrifices to make the world a safer place. 
 
Let us remember that we can do these things not just because of wealth or power, but 
because of who we are [emphasis added]:  one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty 
and justice for all. 
 
Thank you.  May God bless you.  And may God bless the United States of America 
(Phillips, 2011).  
 
 Although the Charlottesville rally was certainly not seen as a tragedy of proportion 
similar to 9/11, Republican senators’ responses suggest they did recognize it as a threat to the 
nation. Senator John McCain issued the following press release on August 12.  
STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN McCAIN ON WHITE SUPREMACIST ATTACK 
IN CHARLOTTESVILLE 
 
Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) released the following statement 
today on the white supremacist attack in Charlottesville, Virginia: 
 
“Our Founders fought a revolution for the idea that all men are created equal. The heirs 
of that revolution fought a Civil War to save our nation, conceived in liberty and 
dedicated to that revolutionary proposition. 
 
“Nothing less is at stake on the streets of Charlottesville, Virginia, where a violent attack 
has taken at least one American life and injured many others in a confrontation between 
our better angels and our worst demons. 
 
“White supremacists and neo-Nazis are, by definition, opposed to American patriotism 
and the ideals that define us as a people and make our nation special. 
 
“As we mourn the tragedy that has occurred in Charlottesville, American patriots of all 
colors and creeds must come together to defy those who raise the flag of hatred and 
bigotry.” 
 
### (The Office of Senator John McCain, 2017). 
 
McCain uses pronouns like “we” and “our” to refer to the audience, consistent with the 
“We as the American people…” theme. Furthermore, McCain explicitly says a “violent attack” 
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has taken place in the midst of this rhetoric. But, it is also telling that his rhetoric subtly 
resembles that of Bush and Obama’s. McCain calls on the American people to consider the 
nation’s history and America’s dedication to liberty. He then asserts that “nothing is less at stake 
on the streets of Charlottesville, Virginia” and finally says “American patriots of all colors and 
creeds must come together,” indicating that a united American front is necessary to preserve and 
defend the American ideals that McCain reminds the audience we have fought for in the past. 
Returning to Senator Scott’s statement, it is clear he also used rhetorical strategies to 
frame the Charlottesville rally as an outside attack to the nation.  
The greatest, underappreciated threat we face is the unraveling that occurs from the inside 
out. We must counter it with the blunt force of unity. 
 
We are Americans. From all walks of life. From many different backgrounds. Everyone 
working towards the American Dream. Nowhere in that dream is there room for racism. 
Nowhere in that dream is there room for hate. It should go without saying that there is 
absolutely no room for violence. Not in Charleston. Not in Charlottesville. Not in 
Alexandria, or anywhere else a hate-filled individual decides to show his or her face. 
 
My op-ed in USA TODAY -  
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/08/14/fight-hatred-fear-domestic-terror-
with-american-ideals-tim-scott-column/564755001/ (Scott, 2017). 
 
Although Senator Scott refers to the threat from the Charlottesville rally as occurring 
“from the inside out” and not an outside force such as that from 9/11, he still declares that the 
Charlottesville threat has no room in the nation. Scott, like McCain, Bush, and Obama, uses first 
person plural pronouns such as “we.” He also emphasizes that Americans are united despite 
differences, which is a rhetorical tactic Bush and Obama used as well. The broad sense all four 
politicians created here was one of national identification and unity, pitting the “American 
people” against the perceived threat.  
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Addressing race in America: a fork in the road 
 Using this united, national language was also a way for senators to address the topic of 
race in America. By using words such as “we” and “American,” GOP senators called on the 
reader to denounce the Charlottesville rally as a clear threat to equality in America. Mike Enzi, a 
senator from Wyoming, posted the following message to his Facebook page on August 14th, two 
days after the Charlottesville ended:  
I was saddened to hear about the tragic events in Charlottesville and my prayers are with 
the victims. White supremacist notions, hate and violence have no place in our society. 
They run counter to our values that we all share as Americans. We as a nation have come 
so far, fighting wars at home and abroad, to protect the idea that all individuals are 
created equal. We should condemn those who use violence to propagate hate, racism or 
anti-Semitism in our country (Enzi, 2017). 
 
 Indeed, the Charlottesville rally was an obvious time to address race in America. The 
marchers were self-identified white nationalists, meaning they “espouse white supremacist or 
white separatist ideologies, often focusing on the alleged inferiority of nonwhites” (Southern 
Poverty Law Center, 2017). It was clear Republican senators saw this as a clear opportunity to 
address the racism at the Charlottesville rally and condemn the white supremacism on public 
display there. In this way, the “We as the American people…” theme was an appropriate 
communications response. During a time when lawmakers were attempting to combat the 
Charlottesville marchers who wanted further racial division, it makes sense Republican senators 
would address this with rhetoric that suggested and promoted unification under one common 
identification: “We as the American people…” However, on the flipside, this strategy is still a 
way to discuss race without fostering a conversation about the Republican Party and its past with 
racial divide.  
One interesting case of a senator addressing race in America was Ben Sasse, who wrote 
about his reflections from the Charlottesville rally in a lengthy Facebook post. While Sasse 
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critiques those on the left for potentially exploiting the divisions in Charlottesville for their own 
political gain, he also took an opportunity to incorporate the Charlottesville rally into a longer 
historical narrative about race in America. Sasse discusses Confederate monuments seemingly as 
a way to zoom out from the Charlottesville rally into the much broader historical racial context 
that it fits into. 
10. Bizarrely, many on the center-left seem not to see that there is little that some on the 
President's team would love more than to transform this into a fight about historical 
monuments. 
 
11. I wish more folks understood how many of the monuments now being debated are not 
really from the post-Civil War period as a way to remember war dead. Rather, contrary to 
popular understanding, many of these statues were explicitly erected as Segregation 
Monuments in the twentieth century, during Jim Crow, as a way of shouting – against the 
American Idea – that public spaces were to be whites-only spaces. Tragically, many of 
these monuments were erected exactly when lynchings of black Americans were being 
celebrated in those communities – and the timing overlap here was not accidental. (It's 
also worth noting that Gen. Robert E. Lee had opposed erecting Confederate Memorials 
because he worried, wisely, that they would become scabs of bitterness to be endlessly 
picked at.) (Sasse, 2017). 
 
Sasse not only breaks from the majority of his colleagues in that he deliberately begins a 
much broader conversation about race in America following the Charlottesville rally, but his lone 
response reveals how a majority of Republicans are still not comfortable discussing race in this 
capacity. No other Republican senator used the Charlottesville rally and Donald Trump’s 
responses as a way to jumpstart a larger conversation about race and the Republican Party. Much 
more common instead was utilizing the “We as the American people…”  rhetorical approach. 
 
Criticism without explicitly criticizing 
 Some senators found ways to either implicitly criticize Donald Trump or make their 
statements unique enough that there were clear differentiating factors between what was coming 
out of the administration and what was being released by their office. However, this strategy was 
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not an explicit condemnation of the antidemocratic rhetoric coming from the administration. In 
this way, senators choosing to utilize this tactic failed to act as democracy’s gatekeepers 
according to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Senators instead attempted to “overlap,” with the 
President and find some common ground without outwardly criticizing him, which would 
potentially jeopardize policy advancements that they valued more. 30 Republican senators, out of 
52, criticized without explicitly criticizing. 
 Only three out of 52 Republican senators were serving on behalf of a state that did not 
swing for Trump in 2016. In other words, the other 47 senators would have to potentially risk 
alienating Trump’s (and also their own) base, who perhaps accepted Trump’s statements and 
agreed with his assertion that there were “very fine people” on both sides. Hence, the implicit 
critique, which was perhaps seen as the only viable option with regard to critiquing the 
President’s responses. Despite electoral demands, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue 
establishment politicians should set aside personal political goals and instead focus on preserving 
democracy when a populist outsider with authoritarian tendencies is attempting to or has taken 
public office. 
For example, consider Senator Bill Cassidy, who issued a total of three responses to the 
Charlottesville rally. The first was a tweet on August 12, which he issued in the form of a 
graphic due to the character limit on Twitter: 
#Charlottesville 
 
Attached photo of statement: 
"We reject those who preach hate. However reprehsnsible their views, the groups that 
protested today in Charlottesville have a constitutional right to free speech and assembly; 
this does not include and does not excuse viokence, which is to be condemned in no 
uncertain terms. We know from history that those who preach hate against some expand 
it to many, eventually including anyone who disagrees with their hate. We are first 
children of God, formed in His image and next fellow Americans, regardless of race, 
religion or creed." (Cassidy, 2017). 
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This was seemingly enough for Cassidy and his staff, as no other statement was issued 
until August 16, when Cassidy tweeted two more times: 
(1/2) As my earlier statements made clear, white-supremacists and Neo-Nazis who 
provoked the events in #Charlottesville are reprehensible. 
 
(2/2) Anything which prolongs or increases the attention these hate groups receive should 
be avoided. (Cassidy, 2017). 
 
It is highly unlikely that Cassidy would want to re-introduce the debacle that was the 
Charlottesville rally just to discuss it on Twitter for fun. In fact, there is likely no other reason 
Cassidy would release these two subsequent tweets if not for the President’s third time 
responding to the Charlottesville rally at a press conference, where he said there was “blame on 
both sides” and that there “were very fine people, on both sides,” inciting criticism from the 
media, Democrats, and even other Republicans (which will be discussed in the following 
section).  
 What is evident in these “criticisms without criticizing” is that while senators did not 
want to agree with Trump after Charlottesville, they did not want to jeopardize policy advances. 
I found these senators to most closely align with what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) characterize as 
“critical loyalists,” or those who “try, in a sense to have it both ways: They may publicly 
distance themselves from the president’s worst behavior, but they do not take any action (for 
example, voting in Congress) that will weaken, much less bring down, the president. In the face 
of presidential abuse, any of these responses will enable authoritarianism” (p. 189). 
There were three broad, rhetorical strategies senators used to criticize without criticizing. 
All three of these strategies were more popular as a whole than explicitly criticizing Donald 
Trump and acting as democracy’s gatekeeprs. However, this sort of unequivocal denouncement 
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of the behavior and actions at the Charlottesville rally is what broadly separates the Senate 
Republicans’ response from that of the administration: 
1. “Call it by it’s name” 
2. “No place, no room” 
3. “Condemn” 
 
 Below, Figure 8 shows the times these tactics were used at least once per senator 
(meaning, if a senator used the word “condemn” in two separate responses, it was only counted 
once). 
Figure 8: Criticism without criticizing 
Rhetorical strategy used % Explicitly critiqued (out of that year) 
“Call it by it’s name” ~35% — 18 out of 52 
“No place, no room” ~40% — 21 out of 52 
“Condemn”  ~42% — 22 out of 52 
 
“Call it by its name” 
There was a tendency to use language that explicitly defined those at the Unite the Right 
rally as groups that Americans understand as promoting white nationalism or racism, such as 
neo-Nazis, the KKK, white supremacists, etc. In other words, senators were supposedly 
compelled to “call it by its name,” referring to the specific groups that started and facilitated the 
Charlottesville rally or the values they espouse (like white nationalism, white supremacism, etc.). 
On August 12, Senator Orrin Hatch tweeted the following: “We should call evil by its name. My 
brother didn't give his life fighting Hitler for Nazi ideas to go unchallenged here at home. -OGH” 
(Hatch, 2017).  
This distinction in response is notable due to its likely nod to Donald Trump and his 
responses to the Charlottesville rally. 18 senators used the tactic of very obviously going above-
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and-beyond to call the protesters or the rally by name, while not mentioning the President by his 
in order to combat this narrative set by President Trump without explicitly critiquing him. 
Senator Lankford of Oklahoma issued this quote within a press release on August 15: 
“I'm incredibly grieved by the violence and hate that took place in Virginia last weekend. 
The supremacy of any race over another is not only immoral, it's contradictory to our 
Declaration of Independence, Constitution and the fundamental idea of America. We 
fought and defeated the type of Nazism on display in Charlottesville; we cannot and must 
not ignore the white supremacy, Ku Klux Klan ideology, alt-right nationalism, hatred, 
and dissension that still lives in our culture today. As a nation, we must recommit to build 
respectful unity together and honor the human dignity of all people. 
 
“In addition, our words must not create confusion. The supremacy of any race is 
abhorrent, unAmerican and should be condemned by everyone. Period.” (The Office of 
Senator James Lankford, 2017). 
 
Senator Lankford’s response is an example of a communications tactic many senators 
used. The Senator listed many specific groups to be addressed—in other words, he “called it by 
its name,” and the final sentence of the release is seemingly a nod to the President’s lack of 
condemnation in his first and third response. However, the Senator does not explicitly call out 
the President by name.  
Another example comes from Senator Todd Young, who issued one tweet on August 12, 
when the Charlottesville rally was still taking place: “The love & compassion I see from 
Hoosiers daily is stronger than the fringe hatred on display in #Charlottesville. The former will 
prevail.” (Young, 2017). Young did not issue any other response about the Charlottesville rally 
until August 15, when he tweeted: “This is simple: we must condemn and marginalize white 
supremacist groups, not encourage and embolden them” (Young, 2017). Like Cassidy, Young’s 
follow-up response on August 15 is likely not just because he decided he would like to issue a 
second response three days after the rally ended. Instead, it is presumably a response to the 
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President’s remarks at his press conference on August 15, and his general hesitation to avoid 
explicitly denouncing specific groups active at the Charlottesville rally.  
Furthermore, Young’s assertion about not encouraging or emboldening white supremacist 
groups is likely a response to white supremacists acknowledging Trump’s responses as a victory 
for them. Following the Charlottesville rally, founder of alt-right website The Daily Stormer 
(which no longer exists) Andrew Anglin “celebrated that Trump ‘outright refused to disavow’ 
the white nationalist rally and movement” (Bertrand, 2017). Anglin took to The Daily Stormer, 
writing:  
People saying he cucked are shills and kikes. He did the opposite of cuck. He refused to 
even mention anything to do with us. When reporters were screaming at him about White 
Nationalism he just walked out of the room" (Bertrand, 2017).  
 
Senator Young is most likely making a statement with his second tweet about Trump and 
the consequences his statements have had. However, like Cassidy, he does so without ever 
naming him and/or explicitly criticizing him. It is possible that this is because there are 
conflicting motives: intra-party unity in a time of potential legislation advancement, maintaining 
support of one’s constituents, and standing up to the president based on personal moral 
obligations. Furthermore, a senator criticizing the president of his own party is probably not 
forgotten easily (especially in a state that swung heavily in favor of Trump in 2016), while a 
safer response will be forgotten once the news cycle is likely focused on a completely different 
topic the next week. In other words: senators here are considering “overlap” as the best strategy, 
deeming legislative advancements and votes more important than standing up to the 
administration. 
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“No place, no room” 
Senators would also often say these organizations and/or what they stood for (white 
supremacy, racism, etc.) have “no place” or “no room” in America. They would wholly reject the 
idea that any of the ideas espoused by Unite The Right marchers define America or what 
America is. A senator could also refer to the rally as a whole, stating that it is imperative to 
recognize the rally as an explicit example of white supremacism, racism, bigotry, etc. 21 out of 
52 Republican senators, or rougly 40%, used this strategy. 
The use of phrases like “no place” or “no room” was extremely prevalent in the rhetoric 
in the responses to the Charlottesville rally. Senators could be referring to a number of topics that 
have “no place” or “no room.” Senators typically were referring to hate, bigotry, violence, or 
things of this nature. For example, Deb Fischer of Nebraska tweeted the following on August 12: 
“The hatred, violence & racism displayed in Charlottesville, VA have no place in our society. 
We must show civility & respect to one another.” (Fischer, 2017). Similarly, Shelley Moore 
Capito from West Virginia tweeted on August 14: “The hate & violence expressed by Neo-Nazis 
& other white nationalists groups in #Charlottesville has absolutely no place in America.” 
(Capito, 2017). This language is strong and explicitly exclusionary for these acts of racism, 
violence, bigotry, etc. However, it does not directly repudiate the President. 
This rhetoric also sends a message that the senators do not just see the acts at the 
Charlottesville rally and Trump’s subsequent behavior as unacceptable in society, but 
unacceptable for the Republican Party as well. However, senators do not mention that the 
Republican Party has housed white nationalists in the past, and in fact attempted to appeal to 
whites specifically as a voting bloc. This sort of language suggests that the Republican Party 
once again finds itself in a double-bind—oftentimes choosing “overlap” over explicit 
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denouncement of POTUS. In this way, criticism without criticizing is still a failure of 
Republicans to act as democracy’s gatekeepers, and they should be more explicit in their 
condemnation in order to preserve democracy and its norms. 
 
“Condemn” 
 It was quite common to “condemn” the events in Charlottesville—using that word 
specifically—and I chose to single out this word because of both its prevalance and because of 
its significance rhetorically. 22 out of 52 Republican senators used “condemn” in some way, or 
roughly 42%. The word “condemn” can be thought of as epideictic rhetoric, or rhetoric that 
affirms norms and values via praise or blame—in this case, it is blame. Sheard (1995) argues that 
epideictic rhetoric is necessary “for it has the capacity to link thought with action, vision with 
reality, criticism with change” (p. 788). By “condemning” the actions in Charlottesville, senators 
seemingly hoped to invoke some sort of change. Jim Risch released a press release where he 
utilizes “We as the American people…” rhetoric and subsequently “condemns” the actions in 
Charlottesville: 
The hateful acts of racism we witnessed in Charlottesville this weekend are reprehensible 
and I condemn them in the strongest terms. White supremacy - and every other form of 
prejudice - does not represent our American values. Vicki joins me in praying for the 
families of those who lost their lives and for those who were injured. (The Office of 
Senator Jim Risch, 2017). 
 
For Republicans, “condemnation” and other epideictic rhetoric is actually a way 
Republican senators could affirm the democratic norms that Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
describe. It protects the democratic norm that we should explicitly denounce antidemocratic 
behavior and rhetoric in order to have a truly multicultural and multiethnic democracy. However, 
they still do so without explicitly criticizing the president, who is the one jeopardizing these 
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norms by refusing to denounce what these senators are condemning. Furthermore, the common 
use of the word “condemn” may also be because of the “small-world network” qualities of the 
Senate that Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) outline, which will be discussed in much more depth in 
a later section. In sum, however, a small-world network is “social organization with unique 
dynamics that influences creativity and productivity and thereby affects the performance of 
Congress” (p. 126). In other words, the Senate acts as a small-world network, facilitating a more 
free flow of ideas. It is possible that because of this social network in the United States Senate, 
communications staffers drew upon one another’s input and previous strategies and subsequently 
employed them in their own office. 
 
“Mr. President…”  
There were 13 Republican senators who did explicitly call for the President to more 
strongly condemn the actions at the Charlottesville rally. Notably, these tended to be more 
senior, well-known, position-holding, and/or swing-vote members of the Republican Party. 
Senators may also have a more “elite” status because of their sheer amount of time in the Senate, 
or even a run for the presidency. Other than their senior status, however, they do not appear to be 
motivated by the other characteristics (state, 2016 election outcomes, reelection year, and if they 
are seeking reelection) that I have outlined previously. Broadly, these senators have carved out 
individual niches within the Party and broadly share an elevated status in the GOP.  
 
Who are they?  
 Below is a list of the 13 Republican senators who criticized the President, as well as a 
brief profile of each to contextualize their relative positions among Senate Republicans and their 
relationship with Donald Trump, from his time as a candidate through his presidency. 
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Understanding where these senators fit into the Republican Senate network will help illuminate 
possible characteristics that enable them to speak out against the President within their own 
party.  
1. Ben Sasse (R-NE): Sasse is the junior senator from Nebraska, first elected in 2014 with a 
34% margin (Ben Sasse, n.d.). This is his first political office. Sasse currently votes in 
line with Donald Trump’s position 90.2% of the time (Tracking Congress In The Age Of 
Trump, 20185). There are eight GOP senators who vote in line with Donald Trump less 
than Sasse, and five of them are on this list (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 
2018). In late February 2016, Sasse became the first sitting Republican senator who 
would refuse to support the then-Republican primary candidate Donald Trump should he 
become the Republican nominee for president (Levy, 2016). He did so in an open letter 
on his Facebook page. 
2. Cory Gardner (R-CO): Gardner is the junior senator from Colorado, first elected in 2014 
with a 2% margin (Cory Gardner, n.d.). He is currently the chairman of the National 
Republican Senatorial Committee. Gardner previously served two terms in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and three terms in the Colorado House of Representatives 
(Cory Gardner, n.d.). Gardner is one of only three GOP senators to represent a state that 
Trump lost in the 2016 election. He currently votes with in line with Donald Trump 
93.5% of the time (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). There are 29 GOP 
senators who vote more, 21 who vote in line less, and 5 senators who vote equally in line 
with Donald Trump (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In October 2016, 
                                                
5 These percentages were obtained in March 2017, and thus may change as time progresses and 
more votes are held. 
 61 
Gardner stated he would not support Trump’s nomination for president, and would be 
writing in Mike Pence (Blake, 2016). 
3. Daniel S. Sullivan (R-AK): Sullivan is the junior senator from Alaska, first elected in 
2014 with a 3.2% margin (Daniel S. Sullivan, n.d.). Sullivan previously served as the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs under President George 
W. Bush, Alaska’s Attorney General under Governor Sarah Palin, and Commissioner of 
the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Daniel S. Sullivan, n.d.). Sullivan votes in 
line with Donald Trump’s position 94.9% of the time—there are 24 who vote in line 
more, 27 who vote in line less, and one senator who votes equally in line with Donald 
Trump (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In October 2016, Sullivan 
stated he would not support Trump’s nomination for president, and would support Mike 
Pence instead. 
4. Jeff Flake (R-AZ): Flake is the junior senator from Arizona, first elected in 2012, now in 
his second term (Jeff Flake, n.d.). He previously served in the U.S. House of 
Representatives for six terms (Jeff Flake, n.d.). Flake currently votes in line with Donald 
Trump’s position 89.8% of the time—there are seven GOP senators who vote in line with 
Donald Trump less than Flake, and four of them are on this list (Tracking Congress In 
The Age Of Trump, 2018). Flake was a member of the Gang of Eight, a 2013 bipartisan 
group of senators committed to immigration reform (Weiner, 2013). In October 2017, 
Flake stated he would not seek reelection in a speech criticizing Donald Trump and the 
GOP (Hosking & Felton, 2017). Flake never endorsed or explicitly denounced Trump’s 
candidacy, but in November 2016, said: "That’s a possibility," when asked about voting 
for Independent candidate Evan McMullin (Lima, 2016). 
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5. John McCain (R-AZ): McCain is the senior senator from Arizona, first elected in 1986 
(John McCain, n.d.). Perhaps most notably, McCain was the Republican nominee for 
president in 2008, losing to Barack Obama before returning to the Senate (John McCain, 
n.d.). McCain currently votes in line with Donald Trump’s position 83% of the time—
there are two GOP senators who vote in line with Donald Trump less than McCain 
(Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). McCain was a member of the Gang of 
Eight, a 2013 bipartisan group of senators committed to immigration reform (Weiner, 
2013). In October 2016, after frequently stating he would support the GOP’s nominee, 
McCain stated he would not support Donald Trump’s candidacy for president and would 
write in another Republican (Everett, 2016). 
6. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): Graham is the senior senator from South Carolina, first elected 
in 2002 (Lindsey Graham, n.d.). Graham previously served four terms in the U.S. House 
of Representatives and one term in the South Carolina House of Representatives (Lindsey 
Graham, n.d.). Graham votes with in line the Donald Trump’s position 88.7% of the 
time—there are five GOP senators who vote in line with Donald Trump less than 
Graham, and four of them are on this list (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 
2018). Graham was was a member of the Gang of Eight, a 2013 bipartisan group of 
senators committed to immigration reform (Weiner, 2013). In October 2016, Graham 
stated he would not support Donald Trump’s candidacy for president, and on Election 
Day he tweeted that he voted for Independent candidate Evan McMullin (Lindsey 
Graham, 2016). 
7. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK): Murkowski is the senior senator from Alaska, assuming office 
in 2002 after being appointed by her father who left to become Alaska’s governor (Lisa 
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Murkowski, n.d.). She then successfully ran for the seat herself in 2004 (Lisa Murkowski, 
n.d.). In 2010, she won reelection via write-in votes after losing in the Republican 
primary to Tea Party candidate Joe Miller (Lisa Murkowski, n.d.). Murkowski votes in 
line with Donald Trump’s position 85.2% of the time—there are four GOP senators who 
vote in line with Donald Trump less than Murkowski, and two of them are on this list 
(Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In October 2016, Murkowski tweeted 
that she would not support Donald Trump’s candidacy for president (Lisa Murkowski, 
2016). Murkowski is one of five female GOP senators.  
8. Marco Rubio (R-FL): Rubio is the junior senator from Florida, first elected in 2010 
(Marco Rubio, n.d.). Previously, Rubio was in the Florida House of Representatives for 
four terms, serving as Speaker for one (Marco Rubio, n.d.). Rubio votes in line with 
Donald Trump’s position 96.7% of the time—there are 12 GOP senators who vote in line 
with Donald Trump more than Rubio (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). 
Rubio was was a member of the Gang of Eight, a 2013 bipartisan group of senators 
committed to immigration reform (Weiner, 2013). Notably, in 2016 Rubio was a 
candidate in the Republican Presidential primary, criticizing Donald Trump during the 
primary but endorsing him following his withdrawal. Rubio is one of two Republican 
Hispanic senators (Ethnic Diversity in the Senate, n.d.). 
9. Mike Lee (R-UT): Lee is the junior senator from Utah, first elected in 2010 (Mike Lee, 
n.d.). Prior to his time in the Senate, Lee had not held an elected office (Mike Lee, n.d.). 
Lee votes in line with Donald Trump’s position 83.9% of the time—there are three GOP 
senators who vote in line with Donald Trump less than Lee, and one of them is on this list 
(Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In October 2016, Lee posted a video to 
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his Facebook page where he called on Trump to step down as the nominee, stating that 
Trump and his conduct was a “distraction” (Mike Lee, 2016). Eventually, Lee revealed 
he voted for Independent candidate Evan McMullin. 
10. Orrin Hatch (R-UT): Hatch is the senior senator from Utah, first elected in 1976 (Orrin 
Hatch, n.d.). He is the longest serving Republican senator in U.S. history (Orrin Hatch, 
n.d.). Hatch votes in line with Donald Trump’s position 96.8% of the time—there are six 
GOP senators who vote in line with Donald Trump more than Hatch (Tracking Congress 
In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In May 2016, after a meeting between Donald Trump and 
Senate Republicans, Lee formally endorsed Donald Trump. Previously, Lee endorsed Jeb 
Bush, then Marco Rubio once Bush withdrew from the race. 
11. Tim Scott (R-SC): Scott is the junior senator from South Carolina, first appointed by 
Governor Nikki Haley in 2013 (Tim Scott, n.d.). Scott won the special election in 2014, 
and successfully ran for reelection in 2016 (Tim Scott, n.d.). Scott votes in line with 
Donald Trump’s position 95.2% of the time—there are 14 GOP senators who vote in line 
with Donald Trump more than Scott (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). 
After endorsing Marco Rubio during the 2016 Republican primary, Scott endorsed 
Donald Trump once he became the presumptive nominee. Scott is currently the only 
African American Republican serving in the Senate (Tim Scott, n.d.).  
12. Ron Johnson (R-WI): Johnson is the senior senator from Wisconson, first elected in 2010 
(Ron Johnson, n.d.). This was his first run for elected office (Ron Johnson, n.d.). 
Preivously, he was the CEO of PACUR, a custom sheet extruder company (Ron Johnson, 
n.d.). Johnson votes in line with Doanld Trump’s position 92.4% of the time—there are 
26 GOP senators who vote more, 16 who vote in line less, and 10 senators who vote 
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equally in line with Donald Trump (Tracking Congress In The Age Of Trump, 2018). In 
October 2016, Johnson announced he plans to retire after finishing his Senate term 
(Carney, 2016). 
13. Jerry Moran (R-KA): Moran is the junior senator from Kansas (Jerry Moran, n.d.). 
Previously, Moran served in the U.S. House of Representatives for Kansas’ 1st District 
for 14 years (Jerry Moran, n.d.). Moran currently votes in line with Donald Trump’s 
position 93.8% of the time—there are 27 senators who vote in line more and 23 senators 
who vote in line less in line with Donald Trump (Tracking Congress In The Age Of 
Trump, 2018).  
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) characterize these senators as using an approach they call 
“containment” to broadly handle President Trump, beginning with his campaign through his first 
year in office. They define politicians who use “containment” as those who “back the president 
on many issues, from judicial appointments to tax and health care reform, but draw a line at 
behavior they consider dangerous” (p. 189). In short: Donald Trump may hold the presidency, 
but they attempt to constrain him in that role.  
What is notable is that the aftermath of Charlottesville is not the first time any of these 
senators have explicitly criticized the president. From a communications standpoint, then, it was 
not a shock to that senator’s constituents when these remarks were made public. Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) mention many of these senators as those who refused to endorse Trump during the 
election, and who have criticized him before. Furthermore, not only have each of these senators 
criticized the administration, many of them vote out-of-line with the administration's stance on 
legislation more often than their other Republican colleagues in the Senate. While Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) note these senators “hardly joined the opposition,” pointing out their high 
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percentages of voting in line with Trump, I argue more context is needed. Of the 10 GOP 
senators (out of 52 total) who vote in line with Donald Trump’s position the least, six of them 
explicitly criticized the president following the Charlottesville rally (Tracking Congress In The 
Age Of Trump, 2018). This means these senators can be looked to as swing votes on important 
legislation for the GOP—although the breaks may not be numerous, they are significant. It is 
partially because of McCain and Murkowski that the Senate failed to produce the votes necessary 
to pass healthcare legislation with a simple majority. Furthermore, out of the 13 senators who 
publicly opposed Donald Trump’s candidacy for president, eight of them explicitly criticized the 
president following the Charlottesville rally.  
 
Strength of response 
 These critiques of the administration took on language that 1) explicitly mentioned the 
President by name and 2) were clear about what they were criticizing him for. For example, Cory 
Gardner, a senator from Colorado and the chairman of the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee (NRSC), tweeted the following on August 12 in the afternoon: “Mr. President - we 
must call evil by its name. These were white supremacists and this was domestic terrorism.” 
(Gardner, 2017). Similarly, John McCain of Arizona and the 2012 Republican nominee for 
president tweeted on August 15: “There's no moral equivalency between racists & Americans 
standing up to defy hate& bigotry. The President of the United States should say so” (McCain, 
2017).  
Senators who did criticize the president did not hold back with their rhetoric. If a senator 
was going to explicitly name Donald Trump, they said what they meant as clearly as possible. It 
seemingly did not make sense, from a communications standpoint, for senators to explicitly call 
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out the president of their own party with ambiguous or vague rhetoric regarding the intent or 
purpose of the statement. There was no mistaking the absolute condemnation by these 
Republican senators. Furthermore, not only did these senators unmistakably criticize the 
president for the handling of his remarks, Ben Sasse even questioned Trump’s ability to lead 
moving forward with regard to national unity:  
What will happen next? I doubt that Donald Trump will be able to calm and comfort the 
nation in that moment. He (and lots of others) will probably tell an awful combination of 
partial truths and outright falsehoods. On top of the trust deficits that are already baked so 
deeply in, unity will be very hard to come by. (Sasse, 2017). 
 
This alluding to the president’s ability to bring Americans together as one nation was also 
a concern of these senators and relates to the “We as the American people…” theme. It was 
seemingly very important for senators to ground their statements, especially these senators who 
were strongly criticizing Trump, from a standpoint as being advantageous or necessary for the 
long-run betterment of the nation—for us all, as one American people. In other words, they are 
acting as what Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) call the “gatekeepers of democracy” by valuing 
democracy over personal political and partisan gain.  
This could also be a two-pronged approach: 1) senators are public figures elected to 
represent all their constituents and likely recognize the necessity of bringing the country together 
in a time of national division, but 2) senators realize if they are to criticize the president of their 
own party, it can’t be without good reason or they will pay a political price. Senator Graham 
released a press release with the following statement that exemplifies the dual critique Trump 
and “coming together as a nation” approach: 
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WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) today made this 
statement on Charlottesville. 
 
“Mr. President, like most I seek to move our nation, my state, and our party forward - 
toward the light - not back to the darkness.  
“Your tweet honoring Miss Heyer was very nice and appropriate.  Well done. “However, 
because of the manner in which you have handled the Charlottesville tragedy you are 
now receiving praise from some of the most racist and hate-filled individuals and groups 
in our country.  For the sake of our Nation -- as our President -- please fix this. 
“History is watching us all.” 
 
##### (The Office of Senator Lindsey Graham, 2017). 
 
 
Grounding their critique in this type of rhetoric assures the American voter they are still 
looking out for their long-term interest—albeit with a few bumps along the way for avid Donald 
Trump supporters. Essentially, it appears that this approach lessens the political risk. 
 
State delegations stick together 
Only four out of the 13 senators who explicitly criticized the President did so without the 
company of another GOP senator from their state. Notably, Cory Gardner was joined by his 
Democrat senator counterpart Michael Bennett, and likewise Ron Johnson with his Democrat 
senator counterpart Tammy Baldwin (not a second Republican senator). However, Marco Rubio 
did so without Bill Nelson, a Democrat, Ben Sasse without Deb Fischer, a Republican, and Jerry 
Moran without Pat Roberts, a Republican. Every other Republican senator who explicitly 
criticized the president was joined by his or her Senate counterpart in their state delegation: 
1. Senators Lisa Murkowski and Dan Sullivan of Alaska 
2. Senators John McCain and Jeff Flake of Arizona 
3. Senators Lindsey Graham and Tim Scott of South Carolina 
4. Senators Orrin Hatch and Mike Lee of Utah 
 
The rollover from one state’s senate office to another in terms of rhetorical strength 
surrounding the President and the Charlottesville rally is likely rooted in research scholars have 
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published on the social network nature of Congress. Specifically, Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) 
describe Congress as a particular type of network: a “small-world network,” or a “social 
organization with unique dynamics that influences creativity and productivity and thereby affects 
the performance of Congress” (p. 126). Essentially, the more a network performs like a small-
world network, the closer the actors within it are to one another. Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) 
assert that Congress operates as a small-world network, drawing on small-world network 
research in other environments from scholars such as Albert and Barabasi (2002) and Watts and 
Strogatz (1999), as well as legislative productivity research from scholars such as Mayhew 
(2005). Members in the U.S. House of Representatives range from a clustering coefficient from 
30% to 60%, meaning that if Representative A and Representative B have each individually co-
sponsored a bill with  Representative C, Representative A and Representative B have a 30-60% 
likelihood of cosponsoring the same bill.  
Furthermore, Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) do not pass over the fact that the U.S. House 
of Representatives and the U.S. Senate are two separate and therefore different branches of 
Congress with individual ways of operating. Most obviously, the Senate is much smaller, and 
thus, their clustering coefficient is larger: ranging from over 46% to over 82% (Tam Cho & 
Fowler, 2010). Senators also serve longer terms and have, generally speaking, higher visibility. 
Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) assert that because of these factors, in terms of the Senate as a 
social network—or more specifically a small-world network—partisanship is less of a barrier 
and the transfer of ideas is more informal.  
While Tam Cho and Fowler’s (2010) research focuses on the small-world network’s 
effect on legislative outcomes, it is possible that these small-world network tendencies of the 
Senate—and more broadly, Congress—are at play with the communications strategies in 
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response to the Charlottesville rally (remember the high amount that senators used the word 
“condemn”). This informal transfer of ideas and intimate social setting lends itself to a probable 
scenario in which senators (and their staff) from the same state delegation would converse and 
decide to share similar strategies in search of a particular communications result. As a result, 
senators who criticized the President often did not come from a wide range of states, but 
clustered together with their Senate cohort.  
Senators Graham and Scott not only mirror each others’ language, but were interacting 
with each other’s social media content. Lindsey Graham tweeted the following on August 17: 
Tim Scott, a very good man and strong voice for South Carolina. 
 
Attached article: 
Tim Scott: Trump's 'moral authority is compromised' after latest Charlottesville 
comments (Graham, 2017). 
 
Tim Scott also produced a series of articles and video content with Senator James 
Lankford of Oklahoma (who did not criticize the President explicitly) about the upside to dining 
with those of another race. Scott serves on the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) 
Committee with Senator Hatch. On August 18, Orrin Hatch retweeted a tweet from Senator 
Lankford about Lankford and Scott’s call-to-action: “RT @SenatorLankford: It’s been a divisive 
week for America. I want to encourage you to consider me & @SenatorTimScott’s 
#SolutionSunday Initiative challenge. Attached CNN Video” (Hatch, 2017). 
This example outlining the tight-knit “small-world network” of the Senate shows one 
way communications tactics could have also reached American voters outside of a senator’s 
state. Furthermore, it shows how one senator, even if they did not criticize Donald Trump 
explicitly, can be publicly recognized by a senator who did, creating a show of solidarity and 
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unification among the Senate Republicans, as well as perhaps strengthening the responses of that 
senator who was not as explicit in their critique of the president. 
 
No pressure for other Republicans 
Although this group of senators was outspoken, it was not a theme for this group to 
publicly call on other Republican senators to say more. A possible explanation for this is that this 
“elite” group of Republican senators recognizes this constitutes less risk for them than it would 
another senator because of their respective status. They do not, therefore, think about “overlap” 
as much as perhaps another senator, because they do not necessarily have to find overlap in order 
to still obtain the electoral and policy outcomes they want. The reality is that those who take 
political risks will sometimes have to accept the consequences on Election Day. Furthermore, 
even these “elite” senators were not totally risk-averse. Consider the case of Jeff Flake from 
Arizona, who announced in October of 2017 that he would not be seeking reelection. Flake 
criticized the President but also his own party, stating that: “It is clear at this moment that a 
traditional conservative who believes in limited government and free markets, who is devoted to 
free trade, who is pro-immigration, has a narrower and narrower path to nomination in the 
Republican party” (Hosking & Felton, 2017).  
Although it is impossible to say what would have happened to Flake’s fate as a senator in 
the 2018 midterm elections, the pressure to comply with one’s party—the pressure to find 
overlap with President Trump, as a Republican—is high, especially at a time when the 
opportunity for legislative advancement is rich with a majority in the White House and both 
houses of Congress. Unfortunately, however, this undermines the possibility of senators acting as 
democracy’s gatekeepers. 
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It is also possible that they do not want to create further intra-party conflict than is 
already evident with the administration and Republican senators. While it is true, generally, that 
Senate Republicans would like to advance a Republican agenda, what this agenda entails is not 
always universally accepted. As the Charlottesville rally was happening in mid-August, the 
Senate was amidst a nationwide healthcare debate. Republicans had through September 30th to 
pass healthcare legislation with a simple majority vote—not 60—which was advantageous given 
their slim majority. However, McCain and Murkowski, two senators who explicitly criticized the 
President following the Charlottesville rally, were also two important swing votes on healthcare 
legislation. The coupling of potentially halting GOP healthcare legislation from passing and 
criticizing GOP colleagues for their rhetoric following the rally may have also been deemed 
undoable.  
This is contradictory to these senators’ commitment to democratic values and norms. It 
reinforces the assertion that “overlap” is oftentimes a justification for party leaders to refrain 
from criticizing an authoritarian leader or even refraining from encouraging others to do so as 
well (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). For this reason, although these 13 senators attempted to act a 
gatekeepers, this weakens their overall support of democratic values and norms that Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) argue are crucial to upholding American democracy. They are protecting 
democracy and its norms, yes, but perhaps not in a way that champions long-term gatekeeping 
coming from a broader Republican base.  
 
Is this normal? 
While the Charlottesville rally was quite the phenomenon, the number of senators 
publicly and strongly breaking with the president of their own party during a time when 
legislation advancement is opportune is still extraordinary.   
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Certainly, the goal of broad, overarching political parties is to advance legislation and 
provide a more navigable path into politics for the average voter. Americans do not have to 
choose between a large number of political parties, but instead: Democrats or Republicans. In 
this way, Republicans caucusing together is the way forward to passing legislation they broadly 
agree on. Republicans, albeit a fraction of Senate Republicans, breaking with the president 
signals democracy as a priority higher than partisanship. 
And furthermore, this is not the first time that American political parties have dealt with 
populist outsiders attempting to leverage a political party’s base for their own rise, as noted by 
multiple historians and scholars. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline three instances which 
“democratic norms have been challenged and even violated” (p. 138). 
The first was FDR’s concentration of federal power during his multiple presidential 
terms, spanning from the Great Depression through World War Two. Roosevelt, while garnering 
praise from many, also was the target of “bipartisan resistance” in response to many of his 
decisions deemed far too overreaching for the Oval Office. Such decisions included his number 
of executive orders, his court-packing scheme, and his decision to run for a third and fourth term 
in office (which was an unwritten norm at the time, but support for term limitations following 
FDR’s presidency was so strong it was passed as the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution). 
Joseph McCarty, a Republican politician during the mid-20th century, posed as the second 
threat, with Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) arguing he threatened the norm of mutual toleration 
through a tactic he developed called “red-baiting.” McCarthy vilified Democratic rivals and even 
campaigned alongside a reluctant, moderate Dwight Eisenhower at the request of the Republican 
National Committee. However, his subsequent attacks on the Eisenhower administration ousted 
him from the good graces of the establishment Republican Party, and the Senate voted to censure 
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him. Although some right-wing populists attempted to keep “McCarthyism” alive, Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) explain they only existed “at the Republican Party’s fringes” (p. 141).  
Finally, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue the Nixon administration exhibited 
authoritarian behavior, claiming he, too, never accepted complete mutual toleration, shown 
through his vilification of the press and his opponents. Of course, his administration is also 
decidedly marked by his wire-tapping of the Democratic National Committee, journalists, and 
other opposition. Yet again, in this example, Nixon’s disregard for democratic norms was 
checked in a bipartisan manner when the Senate investigated his wrongdoing. Knowing he did 
not have the votes to survive impeachment, Nixon resigned. 
What happened in August 2017—public denouncements of the president from multiple 
senators who share his political party—is not quite like any historic political party split. It 
reflects a moral divide that transcends political parties and cuts to the core of the tension that 
results from a populist, outsider candidate rattling the field from the primary into the presidency. 
The following tweet from Lisa Murkowski sums up the general sentiment: 
What the President said yesterday was wrong. There is no moral equivalence between those 
who are inciting hate and division and those who took to the streets to make it clear that those 
views are unacceptable. Every one of us must stand against hatred, bigotry, and violence, in 
both our words and our actions. We all have the responsibility to unite and heal our country 
(Murkowski, 2017). 
 
Sen. Murkowski reflects a general view that is presumably held by these 13 senators: that 
the president is wrong, and they are right. However, it still is not the rhetoric espoused from the 
majority of Senate Republicans. Republicans hanging onto the temptations of “control” and 
“overlap” that Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) describe may be what separates Trump as an outsider 
populist from others in the past. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Although this study is primarily focused on the Republican senatorial response to the 
Charlottesville rally, and ultimately a sitting Republican president, it is notable that the time 
frame during which it occurred coincided with a time of self-reflection and change for the 
Republican Party. Following eight years of President Obama, Republicans saturated the primary 
field with a slew of well-known, elite Republicans, armed and ready to enact the changes the 
RNC deemed necessary for Republicans following Mitt Romney’s loss in the 2012 presidential 
election6. As is well known, however, the eventual Republican nominee and president turned out 
to be a Washington outsider—Donald Trump. 
While breaking with mainstream Republicans on a number of issues either with regard to 
the actual policy or the rhetoric surrounding the issue, Trump gained enough support to win the 
nomination and presidency. Precisely when the RNC was instructing Republicans to embrace 
comprehensive immigration reform, Trump said he wanted to “build the wall.” This kind of 
juxtaposition garnered the applause of political actors like the alt-right, who felt Donald Trump 
would advance broad themes of isolationism and anti-immigration while revolting against the 
establishment. In other words, Donald Trump was the “populist outsider” Levitsky and Ziblatt 
(2018) describe as a threat to democratic values. 
 Indeed, the Charlottesville rally was more than a one-off event: it was a chance for 
Republican leaders to explicitly critique the President for his antidemocratic rhetoric and 
behavior. It was a chance for establishment Republicans to unequivocally call out the leader of 
their own party for bad behavior. And yet, when the opportunity was clear, only 13 out of 52 
                                                
6 Following the 2012 election, the RNC released the Growth and Opportunity Project following 
an assessment of the party. It “issued a list of recommendations to the RNC to help pave a path 
to victory” (Growth and Opportunity Project, 2013). 
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senators took that opportunity—an overall failure for Senate Republicans to carry out their duty 
of acting as democracy’s gatekeepers.  
 Furthermore, the Charlottesville rally exposes the unfortunate, troubling truth about the 
establishment of democratic norms in America: that they rest on systematic racial exclusion. 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, mutual toleration was only established on the 
grounds that racial equality be removed from consideration. Since then, America has had to 
grapple with its democratic norms without this as a foundation. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) 
argue that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives America the chance to form a truly multiethnic 
democracy, but still deem it “America’s greatest challenge” (p. 227).  
In this way, the Charlottesville rally could have sparked a nationwide conversation about 
race, particularly from the Republican Party, which has grappled with it throughout modern 
history. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that handling deepening partisan polarization should 
be based in an effort “to genuinely address the bread-and-butter concerns of long-neglected 
segments of the population—no matter their ethnicity” (p. 228). Instead, the Charlottesville rally 
unfortunately resulted in tactics that avoided this very conversation. Furthermore, it seems the 
President has sought to move in an even more opposite direction—trying to find new ways in 
which to appeal to his base through problematic strategies, such as refusing to denounce white 
supremacist groups following the Charlottesville rally.  
 This is absolutely the wrong direction the President should take. However, instead of 
simply focusing my words to the administration, I will direct them toward the larger Republican 
Party as well. It is imperative the Republican Party confront its historic grappling with race and 
strive to preserve democratic ideals and norms in this critical, historical moment. The Republican 
Party must take a more unambiguous stance toward the President when he violates democratic 
 77 
norms and espouses antidemocratic rhetoric. It is crucial so that all Americans, no matter race, 
religion, or creed, can equally enjoy America’s democratic ideals and norms.  
 This is the first study in the literature that analyzes Republican response to the 
Charlottesville rally through the lens of the theoretical framework in Levitsky and Ziblatt’s 
(2018) How Democracies Die. However, there are parameters to this study and as such, there are 
ripe opportunities for future research. If I had more time in this study, I would have liked to take 
a deeper dive into a wider range of Republicans, as Senate Republicans obviously do not capture 
the entire scope of the Republican Party. Because of this, it would be useful to study other 
Republican coalitions as well in order to understand a broader scope of the GOP. This includes, 
but is not limited to: House Republicans, Republicans in administrative agencies, conservative 
and/or Republican opinion writers, Republican personalities in talk radio, Republicans on 
television, judges, etc. Generally, more groups of Republicans that fall both in and out of 
government. Furthermore, I only analyzed Republican response to the President based on one 
instance. If I had more time, it would be valuable to track Republican “checks” to the President 
over time to see how the Republican Party continues to affirm or stops affirming Trump’s 
antidemocratic behavior. It would be fascinating to see how these senators get louder or quieter 
based on his actions that are blatantly authoritarian and/or antidemocratic. Instead, I only track 
their responses to one encounter with Trump. This could certainly be taken much further. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 The Charlottesville rally offers a unique opportunity for reflection on the United States, 
democracy, and political parties as they stand currently. Not only were the rally’s participants 
and their behavior under scrutiny, but the President’s responses to the rally also raised questions 
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that he violated the democratic norms Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) outline in their theory of 
political parties as democracy’s gatekeepers. These red flags, furthermore, provoked questions of 
how the Republican Party—of which Donald Trump is the highest-ranking official—criticized 
his violation of these democratic norms. In this way, this study was first concerned with 
democracy and how the Republican Party is or is not acting as democracy’s gatekeepers in light 
of the Charlottesville rally. 
Additionally, the blatant white nationalism on display at the rally also put the issue of 
race center-stage—specifically as it relates to the Republican Party. After a historical dive into 
the literature surrounding the emergence of the modern Republican Party, it is noticeable that the 
GOP has continuously wrestled with its approach to the topic of race in America. The racism and 
white nationalism at the Charlottesville rally was an obvious time for the Republican Party to 
discuss race, particularly with how it relates to their party at large. In this way, this study was 
also concerned with race and the Republican Party and how senators’ responses did or did not 
address this topic. 
In order to study these two questions, I first built a sample of Republicans to analyze. I 
chose Republican senators because they are a group of elite, influential actors within the party. I 
then collected information about them: their state, reelection year, whether or not they plan to 
seek reelection, which candidate won their state in the 2016 Republican primary, and which 
candidate won their state in the 2016 general election. I analyzed this information alongside their 
criticism of the president in an attempt to discover what criteria (if any) were common for 
senators who explicitly criticized Trump’s response to the Charlottesville rally. In other words, 
what did senators who criticized the President (setting aside desire for policy overlap and 
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aversion to electoral risk) have in common? In terms of these quantifiable findings, I did not 
recognize any clear patterns that suggested these criteria are indicators of a senator’s response.  
Instead, after an inductive, qualitative analysis of responses (tweets, retweets, Facebook 
posts, and press releases) from August 11 through August 19, what became more clear was that 
there is a group of 13 especially elite Republican senators who did criticize the President and act 
as democracy’s gatekeepers. Furthermore, it was common for these senators to come from the 
same state—only five out of the 13 senators explicitly criticizing the President were not joined 
by an accompanying Republican senator. In this way, the Senate acted as a “small-world 
network,” with senators helping and reinforcing each other in their response to the 
Charlottesville rally. However, these senators did not publicly pressure other Republican 
senators to criticize the President more strongly.  
A more common form of “critique” was criticism without explicitly criticizing—30 out 
of 52 senators used this tactic in some way. In other words, senators would use specific types of 
rhetoric and timing, most likely to indicate distaste for what the President said in response to the 
Charlottesville rally, but intentionally avoided direct conflict with Trump. In this way, these 
senators show what it means to put policy overlap and aversion to electoral risk over their role as 
democracy’s gatekeepers. These findings broadly show that Republican senators failed to 
collectively denounce Trump’s antidemocratic rhetoric in the wake of the Charlottesville rally 
when there was a clear opportunity to do so. 
In terms of addressing race, Republican senators approached the topic by using unified, 
American rhetoric. This is progress for the Republican Party and suggests that Republican 
senators see an opportunity to change the narrative surrounding race and Republican politicians. 
However, what is still consistent in terms of the traditional way Republicans handle talking about 
 80 
race is an avoidance of talking about it in relation to their own party. After the Charlottesville 
rally, senators sought to discuss the topic, but generally not with regard to how the Republican 
Party has historically handled race.  
The Republican Party, moving forward, has an opportunity to address race more 
explicitly. Naturally, we look toward our politicians to participate in and help facilitate this 
conversation. The Republican senators in this study have a platform to stand on and a voice to 
speak with—two things that afford them more influence than a private citizen—and they should 
use them. The Charlottesville rally proved that white supremacism and white nationalism are still 
alive and well, even in August of 2017. In light of this, although Republican senators’ rhetoric 
was not void of talking about race after the Charlottesville rally, it is important to address the 
historic relationship the GOP has had with race in order to move forward with a more 
multiethnic, multicultural political party and democracy more broadly. 
In the final words of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018): “Few societies in history have managed 
to be both multiracial and genuinely democratic. That is our challenge. It is also our opportunity. 
If we meet it, America will be truly exceptional” (p. 231). In terms of the Republican Party’s 
relationship with Donald Trump and its critique of his behavior and rhetoric, it is imperative 
moving forward that Republicans set aside their policy agenda and fear of electoral risk. As the 
leader of the Republican Party, Trump’s power and influence is unmatched—unless it is checked 
by a collective and unified Republican Party that is more committed to democracy than to 
advancing a policy agenda or winning reelection. This is not the Republican Party I observed 
following the Charlottesville rally, but it can be, and I hope it will be. 
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